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―Pragmatism?!—is that all you have to offer?‖1 
—Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern are Dead 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal pragmatism is much misunderstood. Critics vilify it as an 
―amorphous,‖2 anti-theoretical3 and skeptical jurisprudence,4 one that 
 
 
  Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Idaho; Faculty Member, The National 
Judicial College; B.A. University of Minnesota, J.D. Washington University in St. Louis, Ph.D. 
University of Pennsylvania. Member of Missouri and Pennsylvania bars.   
 1.  TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD 58 (Henry Popkin ed., 1967). 
 2. Richard H. Weisberg, It‟s a Positivist, It‟s a Pragmatist, It‟s a Codifier! Reflections on 
Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 85 (1996) (reproaching legal pragmatism for an 
―amorphous nature‖). Accord Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 444 
(1990) (dismissing pragmatism as ―either empty or innocuous‖); Mark Tushnet, Pragmatism and 
Judgment: A Comment on Lund, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 289, 290 (2004) (―[Pragmatism is] an all-purpose 
and almost meaningless label for quite traditional judicial decisions‖). 
 3. See, e.g., P. S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 5 (1987) (describing 
pragmatism as a ―general aversion to theory‖); Ronald J. Bacigal, Implied Hearsay: Defusing the 
Battle Line between Pragmatism and Theory, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1127, 1144 (1987) (rejecting a 
pragmatic understanding of the hearsay rule as an anti-academic approach that sacrifices ―intellectual 
purity‖ and common sense while ―losing sight of the fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule‖); 
Smith, supra note 2, at 437 (―[H]ostility to abstract theory is a central feature in the pragmatic 
temperament.‖). 
 4. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE 95, 151, 160–61 (1986); Sotirios A. Barber, Stanley 
Fish and the Future of Pragmatism in Legal Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (1991); Murray J. 
Leaf, Pragmatic Legal Norms, in RENASCENT PRAGMATISM: STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
72, 73 (Alfonso Morales ed., 2003); Andrew J. Morris, Some Challenges for Legal Pragmatism: A 
Closer Look at Pragmatic Legal Reasoning, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2007); Dmitri N. Shalin, 
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languishes in indeterminacy,
5
 depreciates the distinctive structure of legal 
reasoning and decision-making,
6
 and commits a host of other 
jurisprudential sins.
7
 Even some of its advocates tend to see it as 
philosophically mushy and malleable, a jurisprudence shorn of theoretical 
rigidity, amenable to whatever ends and purposes they wish.
8
 To both 
friend and foe, legal pragmatism thus emerges as something less than 
―real‖ jurisprudence. Like the sorry lackey of the Stoppardian Hamlet‘s 
court,
9
 serious legal scholars tend to treat pragmatism as a theoretical 
backwater, readily dismissed or manipulated at will. 
Among the most persistent criticisms of legal pragmatism is the claim 
that it represents nothing more than an opportunistic ―result-oriented‖ 
 
 
Legal Pragmatism, an Ideal Speech Situation, and the Fully Embodied Democratic Process, 5 NEV. 
L.J. 433, 446, 477 (2005). 
 5. E.g., Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: 
Resurrecting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1444, 1447–48, 
1454 (1994); R. George Wright, Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103, 104–05 
(2004). Cf. Shalin asserts that that pragmatism entails a ―notion of emergent determinism which . . . 
suggests that our principles do not merely describe the world out there but also help usher it in,‖ such 
that for pragmatism ―‗[i]ndeterminacy‘ does not mean the paucity of terms as much as their 
overabundance.‖ Shalin, supra note 4, at 461. 
 6. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 21–24, 36–48 (2006); LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 
4, at 151–64; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 
129–30 (2006); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 219–21 (1993); Morris, supra note 4, at 1–5. 
 7. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 6, at 201–08, 301–02 (arguing that pragmatist judicial reasoning 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has created unprincipled, illogical, and theoretically incoherent 
cases that have diminished the scope of individual liberty while enhancing government power); Cook, 
supra note 5, at 1432, 1443, 1449, 1453, 1457–58 (charging pragmatism, especially as espoused by 
John Dewey, with having bankrupted American jurisprudence by ―dethroning‖ God and replacing 
normative discourse grounded in religious faith with ―raw faith in ‗the power of intelligence,‘‖ the 
experimental method of science, and a ―blind‖ commitment to a ―radical [and dangerous] democratic 
culture‖); Weisberg, supra note 2, at 86–87 (expressing alarm toward legal pragmatism as an 
―intensely ‗problematic,‘‖ overly conservative method that is ―harmful to contemporary legal thought 
and practice‖); Wright, supra note 5, at 104 (―Pragmatist doctrines ultimately tend to drain the life 
from our most adequate and circumstantially appropriate moral vocabularies and . . . in free speech 
adjudication ultimately leads to a normatively flattened free speech law‖). Compare Cook, supra note 
5, at 1447 (―[John Dewey] would consider it ridiculous to reduce constitutional meaning . . . [to] the 
intention of the Framers. . . .‖) with Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive Controversy, in 
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, 323, 323 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) ( ―[A] 
‗pragmatist‘ account of interpretive controversy . . . [that treats] the meaning of any text . . . [as] what 
the text‘s author or authors intended it to mean.‖). 
 8. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 917, 919, 935 (2008) (arguing that originalism in constitutional 
interpretation is defensible on pragmatic grounds since it can lead to ―good consequences‖); Daria 
Roithmayr, “Easy for You to Say”: An Essay on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical 
Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939, 953–54 (2003) (advocating a way of thinking about law 
labeled ―radical pragmatism,‖ defined as a ―protean, unobjective, and unanchored . . . ad-hoc and 
improvisational approach‖ that could be useful for the ―disempowered community‖). 
 9. See STOPPARD, supra note 1, at 58. 
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standpoint. David Luban, for example, asserts that ―legal pragmatism is 
result-oriented or instrumental. Its focus is the well-being of the 
community, not the purity or integrity of legal doctrine.‖10 To Luban, legal 
pragmatism allows for almost anything in judicial decision-making, so 
long as the outcome appears directed to the good of the community. Thus, 
while he acknowledges that legal pragmatists typically favor adherence to 
precedent, Luban chides them for doing so not based on principle, but only 
because doing so is ―instrumentally important.‖11 Whether it be the 
doctrine of precedent in general or some specific doctrinal rule, Luban 
avers that pragmatism recognizes no principled commitment to 
consistency or coherence in legal decision. ―Pragmatists . . . see no 
inherent virtue in logical consistency if it leads to unacceptable outcomes,‖ 
he writes.
12
 Rather, ―what pragmatists seek in legal reasoning is not logical 
neatness but persuasion in the service of reasonable outcomes.‖13 
In similar fashion, Ronald Dworkin characterizes pragmatism as 
sanctioning an approach to adjudication that ―holds that judges should 
always decide the cases before them in a forward-looking, consequentialist 
style.‖14 Dworkin agrees with Luban that pragmatism recognizes no 
principled constraints on judicial freedom. By his understanding, 
pragmatism admits that judges, at their discretion and for reasons of 
expediency, may adhere to precedent. It even allows that instrumental 
considerations generally lead them that way.
15
 But Dworkin claims that 
pragmatism does not compel judges to follow precedent (or even abide by 
legislative judgment) as a matter of principle.
16
 He accordingly sees 
pragmatism as a worrisome interpretive conception of law that sacrifices 
principle and integrity for whatever outcomes would seem to be ―best for 
the future without concern for the past.‖17 To Dworkin, that is, legal 
pragmatism offers nothing but a directive to judges to ―make whatever 
decisions seem to them best for the community‘s future, not counting any 
form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake.‖18 
 
 
 10. David Luban, What‟s Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism? 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43 
(1996) (emphasis added). 
 11. See id. (―Pragmatists nevertheless recognize that conforming to inherited legal doctrine and 
attending to history may be good for the community, so doctrinal integrity remains instrumentally 
important.‖). 
 12. Id. at 45. 
 13. Id. 
 14. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 6, at 21. 
 15. See id. at 21–22. 
 16. See id. at 22. 
 17. DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 151. 
 18. Id. at 95. Accord DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 6, at 21. 
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In this Article, I defend legal pragmatism against charges by Luban, 
Dworkin, and others
19
 that it is a bland, manipulable result-oriented 
jurisprudence. The starting-point is to unpack what is meant by ―result-
orientation.‖ Toward that end, I consider briefly how consequences factor 
in certain contrasting ethical theories, with the moral philosophy of 
utilitarianism serving as a prototype of result-oriented thinking. I then turn 
to legal pragmatism. Drawing upon sources contemporary and classical, I 
argue that legal pragmatism, like the philosophy of pragmatism more 
generally, cannot accurately be characterized as result-oriented. My 
argument is grounded in the classical pragmatist tradition of William 
James and John Dewey, and is informed by their descendants in analytic 
philosophy, C.I. Lewis, W.V.O. Quine, and Hilary Putnam.
20
 It further 
finds inspiration in the jurisprudential writings of Benjamin Cardozo. 
These sources reveal that, in its classical and analytic sense, pragmatism is 
indeed a philosophy that considers consequences to be relevant in matters 
of deliberation and judgment. But it does not appeal to consequences in 
the material, outcome-determinative sense Luban and Dworkin suggest. 
 
 
 19. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note 6, at 129–30 (arguing that 
pragmatism calls for judges to decide cases according to their conception of the most reasonable 
outcome); Nicholas Bamforth, Reform of Public Law: Pragmatism or Principle? 58 MOD. L. REV. 
722, 724 (1995) (―Pragmatic consideration . . . looks to the likely consequences of a particular 
outcome‖); Cloud, supra note 6, at 212–14 (claiming that legal pragmatism directs judges to base their 
decisions on the results they consider best); Cook, supra note 5, at 1447 (criticizing the application of 
John Dewey‘s pragmatism to law in part because Dewey allegedly would treat reaching the ―right 
answer‖ in adjudication as calling for nothing more than inquiry into ―which consequences one finds 
most desirable‖); Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering and the Pragmatist Dilemma, in 
RENASCENT PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 220, 223–26 (arguing that pragmatism suffers from the 
serious deficiency of allowing ends to justify means); Morris, supra note 4, at 13 (―[P]robably the 
central point of pragmatism is to produce the best substantive outcome in the specific context of each 
individual case.‖) (footnote omitted); Daniel J. Morrissey, Pragmatism and the Politics of Meaning, 43 
DRAKE L. REV. 615, 631 (1995) (presenting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as a pragmatist who ―offered 
a practical, result-oriented approach‖ to legal theory); Shalin, supra note 4, at 458 (―Rightly or 
wrongly, weighing consequences is perceived as the chief method of [at least some forms of] 
pragmatist adjudication. . . . Zeroing in on legal outcomes and their long-term impact on society poses 
serious challenges.‖) (footnote omitted); Lael Daniel Weinberger, The Monument and the Message: 
Pragmatism and Principle in Establishment Clause Ten Commandments Litigation, 14 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 393, 411 (2008) (describing legal pragmatism as a ―results-oriented approach‖). 
 20. By following the classical and analytic strand of pragmatist thought, I thus eschew the 
popular postmodern relativistic pragmatism of Richard Rorty. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY 
AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); Richard Rorty, 
Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism, in PRAGMATISM: A READER 329 (Louis Menand ed., 1997). 
Additionally, the pragmatist jurisprudence I here advance differs importantly from Richard Posner‘s 
lively theory of pragmatic adjudication. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 40, 230–
65 (2008); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1–96 (2003); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227–310 (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 387–405 (1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454–69 
(1990). See infra text accompanying notes 378–87. 
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Rather, pragmatism looks to consequences as epistemological indicia or 
measures of truth. Pragmatically speaking, true ideas hold great 
instrumental value—in William James‘s terms, the truth is ―good in the 
way of belief.‖21 The ability to distinguish in practical affairs between truth 
and falsehood is a central cognitive skill with incontestable practical 
benefits to human life. We search for truth not in idle curiosity but from 
practical need. Interpretation, classification, and conceptual ordering 
across the reaches of experience factor importantly in sorting out 
confusion and in settling questions that impact our lives and future 
conduct. Reflective knowing, i.e., the possession of a coherent set of 
―true‖ beliefs, is thus, as John Dewey phrased it, ―instrumental to a control 
of the environment.‖22 Grasping a rational conceptual system—a 
comprehensive, consistent, and orderly arrangement of ideas and beliefs—
accordingly produces, in the most robust pragmatic sense, ―desirable 
consequences.‖23 
Contrary to the disputations of Luban, Dworkin, and others, pragmatic 
concern for consequences thus has nothing to do with satisfying a ready-
made teleological standard. To say that pragmatism entails an exclusively 
forward-looking consequentialism grievously mismeasures and distorts the 
integrity of pragmatist philosophy. For as I detail below, pragmatism‘s 
mainstream classical and analytic tradition sets forth a philosophical 
method only. By express design, it endorses no special results and favors 
―no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method.‖24 Unequivocally, it shuns 
the commitment to result-orientation imagined by its critics. Instead, it 
embraces the very conditions of coherence and consistency they say it 
lacks. For to pragmatism, conclusions and judgments are true (and hence 
consequentially desirable) insofar as they satisfy intellectually by working 
to resolve trouble and uncertainty in some aspect of the human 
environment while fitting logically within a coherent and usable system of 
belief. Unfolding this understanding of pragmatism, as applied to law, is 
the purpose of this Article. 
II. RESULT-ORIENTATION 
Result-oriented theories render judgments according to whether 
expected outcomes satisfy some standard or set of criteria determined prior 
 
 
 21. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 42 (Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1907). 
 22. JOHN DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC 30 (Dover Pub. 1954) (1916). 
 23. Id. at 318. 
 24. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 32. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to and independent of the activity judged. Consequentialist ethics such as 
utilitarianism provide the paradigm and a sound working model for 
understanding result-oriented theories. 
A. Utilitarian Ethics 
Utilitarianism draws upon the familiar and deeply plausible intuition 
that right conduct is associated with good consequences. In its classical 
form, the utilitarian theory stipulates that the rightness of an act depends 
entirely on the goodness or badness of the consequences that attend it.
25
 
This unqualified priority that utilitarianism gives to consequences is what 
makes it a result-oriented standpoint. To the utilitarian, moral deliberation 
and judgment are confined to a comparison of expected outcomes. In 
prescribing that an act is morally right if and only if it leads to the best 
state of affairs overall, utilitarianism excludes as extraneous all aspects of 
the actions under consideration that do not bear upon the result. 
The utilitarian standpoint sounds simple. Its singular focus on 
consequences suggests ease of application. Yet utilitarian philosophers 
have frequently disagreed over how to apply it. Disagreement goes to 
several points: how to characterize the consequential dimension of utility 
(as happiness, pleasure, interests, or preference-satisfaction);
26
 whether to 
treat all pleasures and preferences as commensurate or differentiated 
according to qualitative worth
27
 or distributive fairness;
28
 whether any 
sources of satisfaction (e.g., pleasures of malevolence) should be excluded 
from utility calculations as intrinsically bad;
29
 how best to understand the 
notion of utility maximization (sum total or average utility);
30
 and whether 
to weigh an act‘s likely consequences directly on the scale of utility (act-
utilitarianism) or by way of a two-step process focused on the 
consequences associated with moral rules (rule-utilitarianism) or general 
 
 
 25. See ROLF SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS: A UTILITARIAN 
ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW 1 (1975); R.G. Frey, Introduction: Utilitarianism 
and Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 3, 4 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984). 
 26. See SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 25, at 26–28; 
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 27–30 (Rev. ed. 1994); Frey, supra note 
25, at 11. 
 27. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8–10 (Hackett Pub. 1979) (1861); G.E. MOORE, 
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 77–81 (1903); J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR & AGAINST 1, 14–25 (1973). 
 28. E.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 26, at 31. 
 29. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234–35, 276–77 (1977); MOORE, 
supra note 27, at 207–14; Rolf Sartorius, Persons and Property, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS, supra note 
25, at 196, 197; Smart, supra note 27, at 25–27. 
 30. See Sartorius, Persons and Property, supra note 29, at 197. 
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act-types (utilitarian generalization).
31
 Commonly today, the term 
―utilitarianism‖ thus denotes a broad range of moral theories. As stated by 
philosopher Rolf Sartorius, ―there are almost as many forms of 
utilitarianism worthy of serious consideration as there are serious 
philosophers with express utilitarian sympathies.‖32 
Nonetheless, several features characterize utilitarian ethics. Utilitarians 
tend to posit certain states of affairs as intrinsically good, while treating 
others as bad.
33
 They presuppose that the moral rightness of an action is to 
be determined solely by considering its ―total outcome‖34 or ―total 
expectable consequences,‖35 i.e., the overall quantity of good and bad 
states of affairs likely to result should the action be performed.
36
 In 
addition, they maintain that each person ought to do ―that act which, of all 
the acts open to the person, would issue in the obtaining of the best total 
outcome.‖37 Finally, the utilitarian assumes an attitude of relative 
indifference to the reasoning or motive behind actions judged right or 
wrong according to their consequences.
38
 What matters to the utilitarian is 
that the best total outcome is achieved—irrespective of why or in what 
way.
39
 As John Stuart Mill stated, ―[i]t is the business of ethics to tell us 
what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of 
 
 
 31. See RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 271–85, 292–300 (1979); 
SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
 32. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 25, at 12. 
 33. See, e.g., Frey, supra note 25, at 4; Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Utilitarianism, 
PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS‘N, Jan. 1994, at 7, 7; Bernard Williams, A Critique of 
Utilitarianism, in SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 75, 83–84 (1973). 
 34. Thomson, supra note 33, at 7. 
 35. BRANDT, supra note 31, at 281. 
 36. See Frey, supra note 25, at 4; H.L.A. Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, in H.L.A. 
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 181, 182 (1983); Smart, supra note 27, at 1, 4, 
12–13, 45; Thomson, supra note 33, at 7; Williams, supra note 33, at 85–86. 
 37. Thomson, supra note 33, at 7. Accord BRANDT, supra note 31, at 271, 278; SARTORIUS, 
INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 25, at 12; Frey, supra note 25, at 4. 
 38. See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 31, at 272 (―Historically defenders of the [utilitarian] theory 
have had little to say about [motivation]. . . .‖); MILL, supra note 27, at 18 (―Motive has nothing to do 
with the morality of the action.‖). Cf. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 493 (7th ed., 
Hackett 1981) (1907) (―[T]he Utilitarian will praise the Dispositions or permanent qualities of 
character of which felicific conduct is conceived to be the result, and the Motives that are conceived to 
prompt to it when it would be a clear gain to the general happiness that these should become more 
frequent. . . .‖). 
 39. See MILL, supra note 27, at 18. Mill argues that, for the utilitarian, motive has no bearing on 
the rightness of action. (―He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, 
whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble. . . .‖); Williams, supra note 33, at 
87 (―[F]or the consequentialist, even a situation . . . in which the action itself possesses intrinsic value 
is one in which the rightness of the act is derived from the goodness of a certain state of affairs—the 
act is right because the state of affairs which consists in its being done is better than any other state of 
affairs accessible to the agent.‖). 
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ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of 
duty.‖40 Intention matters for the utilitarian: morally right action comes 
from intending to do the act which happens to lead to the best overall 
outcome.
41
 Acting from the motive of achieving that end is irrelevant, even 
though motive is what propels the actual doing or practice of the action 
deemed morally right.
42
 
B. Practice-Oriented Ethics 
Practice-oriented theories, to the contrary, look for the justification of 
judgments in the performance or ―doing‖ of the judged activity itself. In 
the realm of ethical theory, the contrast between result-orientation and 
practice-orientation was well-made by Aristotle: 
In the arts, excellence lies in the result itself, so that it is sufficient if 
it is of a certain kind. But in the case of the virtues an act is not 
performed justly or with self-control [i.e., morally] if the act itself is 
of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent has certain 
characteristics as he performs it. . . .
43
 
The characteristics Aristotle went on to identify address the practice of 
the action—specifically, whether it was performed by a person of practical 
wisdom or reason: someone who knew what he or she was doing, chose to 
do the act, chose it for its own sake, and acted in a manner reflecting habit 
or consistency of character.
44
 Aristotle‘s ethics—often today termed 
―virtue ethics‖—are thus fundamentally practice-oriented, theoretically 
riveted on the cognitive aspects of the practice or performance of the 
action judged right or wrong, not simply on its consequences or resulting 
outcome.
45
 
 
 
 40. MILL, supra note 27, at 17. 
 41. See id. at 18 n.2 (―The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, 
upon what the agent wills to do.‖). 
 42. See id. at 17–20, 18 n.2 (―[I]t is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to 
conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or 
society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but 
for that of individuals.‖).  
 43. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105a26-31 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (c. 330 B.C.). 
 44. See id. at 1105a32-34. 
 45. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. SALKEVER, FINDING THE MEAN: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN 
ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 65–71, 135–42 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of practice 
in Aristotle‘s ethics and political philosophy); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: 
ARISTOTLE‘S THEORY OF VIRTUE 4–12 (1989) (discussing how Aristotle‘s ethics emphasizes the 
development of good character and the process or practice of reasoned judgment as to right conduct); 
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While the difference between result-orientation and practice-orientation 
in ethical thought comes through vividly in the contrast between 
utilitarianism and Aristotle‘s ethics, the line separating the two approaches 
is not always so stark. Most significantly, it is critical to note that appeal to 
consequences or the anticipated results of action alone is not enough to 
make a method of judgment result-oriented. Recall the supreme principle 
of morality postulated by Immanuel Kant: the categorical imperative.
46
 
Among other things, the categorical imperative stipulates that an action is 
morally right if and only if it could be adopted as a universal rule or 
principle for all to follow.
47
 This universal law formulation of the 
categorical imperative centers moral decision-making on the pithy 
command: ―Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.‖48 
Kant insisted that in applying the categorical imperative the 
consequences of action are irrelevant. In this, he never wavered. Indeed, 
the key to his conceiving of the supreme principle of morality as a 
categorical imperative is that morality commands according to 
―unconditional practical laws‖49 that give no regard to desires,50 
 
 
J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle on Action, in AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY, ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE‘S ETHICS 93, 
94 (1980) (―Aristotle . . . draws a strong contrast between what is done . . . and why it is done.‖). 
 46. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 401–03, 412–34 
(Lewis White Beck trans., 1969) (1785); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF 
JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 225–27 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed., 1999) (1797). 
See generally PAUL GUYER, KANT‘S GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 73–134 
(2007) (detailed study of Kant‘s categorical imperative); H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: 
A STUDY IN KANT‘S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1947) (classic study of Kant‘s ethics); JOHN RAWLS, 
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 143–325 (2000) (highly important and 
informative set of lectures on Kant‘s moral philosophy). 
 47. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 30, 69–70 (Lewis White Beck 
trans., 1956) (1788); KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 402–
03, 421–24; KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 225–26. 
 48. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 421. Accord 
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 226 (―The supreme basic 
principle of moral philosophy is therefore: act according to a maxim that can at the same time be valid 
as a universal law.‖). 
 49. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 221. Accord KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 31 (―The practical rule is therefore unconditional 
and thus is thought of a priori as a categorically practical proposition.‖); KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 389 (―[A] law, if it is to hold morally, i.e., as a ground of 
obligation, must imply absolute necessity. . . . ‖). 
 50. See KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 21 (―All practical principles 
which presuppose an object (material) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are 
without exception empirical and can furnish no practical laws.‖). 
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inclinations,
51
 or consequences.
52
 ―The majesty of duty,‖ Kant wrote, ―has 
nothing to do with the enjoyment of life.‖53 Material considerations, 
whether tied to happiness, prudence, self-interest, or even the overall well-
being of society, have no bearing on the moral rightness of action.
54
 From 
the moral point-of-view, right conduct is determined by unconditional 
conformance with the categorical imperative, no matter ―the material of 
the action [or] its intended result.‖55 
Nonetheless, Kant observed that giving heed to the expected results of 
action can sometimes determine compliance with the categorical 
imperative. On point is his famous example of false promising.
56
 The 
situation is straightforward: ―May I, when in distress, make a promise with 
the intention not to keep it?‖57 In reasoning that making a deceitful 
promise under such conditions is logically contrary to the categorical 
imperative, Kant wrote: 
The shortest but most infallible way to find the answer to the 
question as to whether a deceitful promise is consistent with duty is 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 400 
(―[A]n act from duty wholly excludes the influence of inclination and therewith every object of the 
will. . . .‖); KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 216 (―[T]he laws of 
morality . . . command everyone without regard to their inclinations. . . .‖). 
 52. See, e.g., KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 401 
(―[T]he moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in any principle 
of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect.‖); id. at 402 (distinguishing 
between morally right action and action in conformance with morality but grounded in prudence and 
―based only on an apprehensive concern with consequences‖); IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: 
THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON‘T WORK IN PRACTICE 287 (E.B. Ashton trans., U. Pa. 
Press 1974) (1793) (rejecting hedonistic consequentialism on the ground that ―[t]he will thus pursuant 
to the maxim of happiness vacillates between motivations, wondering what it should resolve upon. For 
it considers the outcome, and that is most uncertain.‖). 
 53. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 88. 
 54. See id. at 21–26 (arguing that happiness, pleasure, etc. can never establish moral laws but 
only material practical principles for action); id. at 93 (―[T]o further one‘s happiness can never be a 
direct duty, and even less can it be a principle of all duty.‖); KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 414–19 (discussing how reasons for action that are based 
on considerations of prudence, happiness, etc. serve as hypothetical, not moral, imperatives); KANT, 
ON THE OLD SAW, supra note 52, at 279 (arguing that when reasoning from the standpoint of morality 
one must ―completely abstract from . . . [the] consideration [of happiness and] . . . seek as best he can 
to be conscious that no motive derived from it has imperceptibly mingled with his definition of his 
duty. . . .‖). 
 55. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 416. 
 56. Kant discussed false promising several times. The most sustained treatment comes in the 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. See FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 
supra note 46, at 402–03, 422, 429–30. For illuminating discussions of the example‘s importance and 
logical argumentative structure, see FRED FELDMAN, INTRODUCTORY ETHICS 109–11 (1978); GUYER, 
supra note 46, at 52–53, 84–86, 120–21; PATON, supra note 46, at 152–54; RAWLS, supra note 46, at 
170–72, 190–91. 
 57. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 46, at 402. 
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to ask myself: Would I be content that my maxim (of extricating 
myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold as a universal 
law for myself as well as for others? . . . I immediately see that I 
could will the lie but not a universal law to lie. For with such a law 
there would be no promises at all, inasmuch as it would be futile to 
make a pretense of my intention in regard to future actions to those 
who would not believe this pretense or—if they overhastily did 
so—who would pay me back in my own coin. Thus my maxim 
would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal 
law.
58
 
Kant‘s reasoning here fully takes consequences into account. Yet his 
approach is far from consequentialist (or result-oriented). Kant understood 
that an approach is result-oriented only if the consequences of action, as 
factored into some previously agreed-to standard, provide the determining 
ground of an action‘s rightness. If the consequences or anticipated results 
are only consulted for the information they provide about the full import 
of the action, information that ought (if not must) reasonably be 
considered by any person deliberating (non-consequentially) whether to 
perform the act, then taking consequences into account is fully compatible 
with a practice-oriented approach. For Kant, the critical consequential 
consideration in the case of false promising went to the foreseeable long-
term results that would follow should false promising become a universal 
moral law. He recognized that such a general rule of moral conduct would 
eventually destroy the institution of promise-making, thereby undermining 
all opportunity for the making of false promises.
59
 Universalization of the 
maxim of false promising is logically incoherent because it is self-
contradictory. To will false promising as a universal moral rule would 
simultaneously be to will that it not become such a rule, for it would be to 
will the elimination of all opportunity to make such illicit promises.
60
 
Only by considering foreseeable consequences in this way was Kant 
able to demonstrate the contradiction in the conception of the false 
promise moral rule when considered under the universal law formulation 
of the categorical imperative. This does not, however, make his approach 
result-oriented. Kant dismissed the false promise moral rule because it 
could not logically be universalized, not because the consequences 
 
 
 58. Id. at 403. 
 59. See id. at 422 (―For the universality of [the] law [directing the making of deceitful promises] 
. . . would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible.‖). 
 60. Id. (―[I]t could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself; rather it 
must necessarily contradict itself.‖). 
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attending its universalization would be less desirable than those likely to 
follow from some alternative state of affairs—such as those associated 
with a general rule of truth-telling.
61
 Kant understood very well that the 
distinguishing mark of result-oriented approaches is that the justification 
for judgment is grounded fully (in a determinative sense) in the 
consideration of outcomes or consequences, making the theoretic 
significance of such consequences far greater than that of being mere 
factors to consider in assessing compliance with a non-result-based 
standard. 
III. PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGMATISM 
Like Kant with regard to moral reasoning, pragmatism appeals to 
consequences in the epistemological realm in a non-result-oriented 
fashion. This becomes clear by considering certain central aspects of 
pragmatic philosophy. To begin, a caveat is in order: Pragmatism is not a 
philosophy of substantive answers. It offers a method. In the words of 
William James, one of its founders, pragmatism is less a strict doctrine 
than a handy label for ―a number of [philosophic] tendencies that hitherto 
have lacked a collective name.‖62 To James, the emergence of pragmatism 
marked a long overdue, yet ―slow shifting in the philosophic 
perspective‖63 away from the highly rationalistic and abstract theories 
identified with Western philosophy. Among the philosophic tendencies 
gathered under the pragmatic label, four are of especial importance for 
considering the question of result-orientation: rejection of absolutism, 
radical empiricism, instrumentalism, and the connected ideas of 
workability and the evolutionary growth of knowledge. 
 
 
 61. The subtleness of Kant‘s point has eluded many. Even John Stuart Mill failed to understand 
(or acknowledge) it. In Utilitarianism, Mill argued that every time Kant tried to apply the categorical 
imperative he wound up reasoning consequentially. See MILL, supra note 27, at 4 (―[W]hen [Kant] 
begins to deduce from [the categorical imperative] any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost 
grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical . . . impossibility. . . . All he 
shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to 
incur.‖). See generally ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 40–41, 259–69 (2008) (discussing the 
relevance of consequences for Kant‘s ethics, while distinguishing his ethics from consequentialism). 
 62. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 29. 
 63. WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM 190 (University of Nebraska Press 1996) 
(1912). 
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A. Rejection of Absolutism 
Perhaps the dominant trademark of the Western philosophic tradition 
has been a theoretical preference for absolute, unbendable, a priori truths 
posited as antecedent, superordinate, and transcendent to knowledge based 
on experience and observation. Pragmatism challenges this tradition. 
William James regarded the absolutist search for ―the Truth, conceived as 
the one answer, determinate and complete, to the one fixed enigma which 
the world is believed to propound‖64 as a form of ―pseudo-rationality.‖65 It 
was, in his view, less a formula for grasping hold of truth than a psychosis 
of sentimental or ―tender-minded‖66 intellectual longing.67 In one sense, to 
follow this longing is innocuous. For James acknowledged that the 
absolutist vision of reality as perfect, complete, and fixed from all eternity 
does present a legitimate metaphysical hypothesis—just not a very good 
one.
68
 He saw far greater explanatory value in the alternative hypothesis of 
pragmatism: that ―reality . . . is still in the making,‖69 and that a degree of 
ignorance will ever taint our knowledge of it.
70
 
Yet there is another, more troubling side to absolutism. James 
cautioned that, ―to understand life by [absolute] concepts is to arrest its 
movement.‖71 Absolutism, that is, stunts the growth of understanding by 
discouraging further inquiry into matters and realms of knowledge said to 
be, for all time, determinate and fixed. Pragmatism, to the contrary, moves 
life forward. By treating all truth-claims as provisional and subject to 
future rejection and revision,
72
 the pragmatic method embraces a 
developmental view of knowledge that encourages continuous inquiry. 
John Dewey, another principal architect of the philosophy of 
pragmatism, agreed that knowledge is ever dubitable and indefinite.
73
 Yet 
 
 
 64. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 115. 
 65. WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE 73 (University of Nebraska Press 1996) (1909). 
 66. William James, The Sentiment of Rationality, in WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE 63–
64 (Dover Pub. 1956) (1897), reprinted in WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 3, 4 (Hafner 
Press 1948). 
 67. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 126–27, 129. 
 68. See JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 71–81; JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra 
note 21, at 81, 127–28. 
 69. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 123 (emphasis omitted). 
 70. Id. at 81; James, The Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 66, at 65–70, ESSAYS IN 
PRAGMATISM 5–8. 
 71. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 244. 
 72. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 220–23 (Harvard Univ. Press 1975) 
(1909); A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 395–400; PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 81–83, 
124–25. 
 73. See JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
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for him, the importance in recognizing this went beyond epistemological 
method to the social good. Dewey was profoundly concerned with the 
construction of social realities and the making of practical, social, and 
moral judgments.
74
 He maintained that social realities are always 
incomplete and not fully available to our understanding.
75
 Hence, social 
judgments and moral standards should be understood as no more than 
―working hypotheses,‖76 provisional claims subject to question, testing, 
and revision.
77
 To treat them otherwise, as forever immutable and 
unchangeable, both clogs understanding
78
 and kindles social conflict and 
tension between cultures and societies.
79
 Absolutism was thus to Dewey a 
dangerous metaphysical approach. Moral principles and standards, he 
thought, carry for the most part only the authority of custom.
80
 Absolutists, 
however, deify such principles as eternal, final, and fixed, beyond rebuke 
or need of reevaluation.
81
 While this attitude may be feasible in small, 
insular, self-contained societies, Dewey trembled at its persistence in the 
modern world. He feared that staunch, unreflective adherence to 
supposedly eternal truths in a shrinking world undergoing vast social 
change and regular interaction between once-distant and still-disparate 
cultures is a recipe for ―social clash, an irreconciled conflict of moral 
standards and purposes, the most serious form of [cultural] warfare.‖82 
B. Radical Empiricism 
Alongside its rejection of the rationalist, absolutist tradition, 
pragmatism embraces a robust empiricist account of knowledge and belief. 
 
 
AND ACTION 33, 204–05 (1929); JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 130 (Prometheus 1991) (1910). 
 74. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY vii–xxv, 71–75, 92–123 
(Enlarged ed., Dover Pub. 2004) (1948); JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 1–83, 278–
332 (1922). 
 75. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 73–74 (1927); DEWEY ESSAYS IN 
EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 330, 336–37. 
 76. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 56; John Dewey, Logical Method 
and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26 (1924). Cf. RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 83 
(―[N]otions, theories, [and] systems . . . must be regarded as hypotheses.‖). 
 77. See DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 279 (―[A]ll moral judgment 
is experimental and subject to revision.‖). 
 78. See DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 73, at 5. 
 79. See DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 78–83. 
 80. Id. at 81. Cf. THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 73, at 16 (―If one looks at the 
foundations of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as an anthropologist looks at his material, that is, 
as cultural subject-matter, it is clear that these philosophies were systematizations in rational form of 
the content of Greek religious and artistic beliefs.‖). 
 81. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 81. 
 82. Id. at 82. 
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James liked to characterize pragmatism as a philosophy of ―radical 
empiricism,‖83 a philosophy that views the world as a place ―where 
experience and reality come to the same thing.‖84 All knowledge, 
according to James, begins with immediate ―pure experience.‖85 Later 
pragmatists agreed. C. I. Lewis stipulated that ―all which is knowable or 
even significantly thinkable must have reference to meanings which are 
sense-representable.‖86 W.V.O. Quine concurred, arguing that the most 
reasonable ontology is that which offers ―the simplest conceptual scheme 
into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and 
arranged.‖87 As described by James, we experience ―primordial‖ concrete 
particulars,
88
 ―simple that[s], as yet undifferentiated into thing and 
thought.‖89 Cognitively we convert this ―quasi-chaos‖90 of immediately 
given ―primal stuff‖91 into a system of sensible experiences.92 While this 
―flux of sensible experience‖93 is characterized largely by discontinuity 
and disorder,
94
 we strive through reflection to iron out the disorder—
weighing consequences, modeling commonality, mirroring consistency—
 
 
 83. See, e.g., JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 41–44, 47; JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 6–10; JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 326, 
372–73; William James, Preface, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE, supra note 66, at vii–ix. 
 84. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 59. Accord WILLIAM JAMES, 
SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY: A BEGINNING OF AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 96 
(University of Nebraska Press 1996) (1911) (―[T]he whole of immediate perceptual experience . . . is 
reality intimately and concretely found.‖). For detailed accounts of James‘s notion of radical 
empiricism, see 2 ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY G. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
AMERICA 662–73 (1977); Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 37, 46–51 (Morris Dickstein 
ed., 1998). 
 85. See, e.g., JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 23–24, 74; JAMES, A 
PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 372. 
 86. C. I. LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION 171 (1946). Lewis 
acknowledged that there are certain types of knowledge, e.g., propositions of logical and mathematical 
truth, that are not empirical but knowable a priori. Id. at 24. Yet even there, truth-claims are subject to 
verification ―by reference to sense meanings.‖ Id. at 171. 
 87. Willard van Orman Quine, On What There Is, in WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A 
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 1, 16 (2d revised ed. 1980). 
 88. See JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 106 (―concrete percepts . . . 
[are] primordial . . . .‖). 
 89. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 74. Accord id. at 23 (describing 
that which we directly experience as ―plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that‖). 
 90. Id. at 63, 65. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. See C.I. LEWIS, MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER 29 (Dover Pub. 1956) (1929) (―The world of 
experience is not given in experience: it is constructed by thought from the data of sense.‖). 
 93. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 73. 
 94. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 63–64. 
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so as to construct ―an orderly inner and outer world‖ 95 made up of things 
differentiated and named. 
Reality as we know it is thus, according to pragmatism, a ―man-made 
fabric,‖96 nothing more than ―an accumulation of our own intellectual 
inventions.‖97 The world, as we conceive it, and ―truth,‖ insofar as we 
grasp it, are products of our own evolutionary process of world-making.
98
 
As Hilary Putnam put it, ―[w]e use our criteria of rational acceptability to 
build up a theoretical picture of the ‗empirical world.‘‖99 Yet James 
insisted that as we go about world-making we ―must neither admit . . . any 
element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude . . . any element that 
is directly experienced.‖100 The whole of truth and reality, as we conceive 
them, must ―grow[] up inside of all the finite experiences.‖101 Fidelity to 
that ―originally chaotic pure experience[]‖102 is thus essential so as to 
transcend it. 
The fealty to experience that pragmatism requires cannot be overstated. 
James stressed that ―a real place must be found for every kind of thing 
experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic 
arrangement.‖103 George Herbert Mead argued that the whole of ―the 
knowledge-process lies inside of experience.‖104 Putnam cautioned that we 
must continually revise our criteria of rational acceptability to ensure that 
they fit the picture of the empirical world that we devise.
105
 Quine insisted 
that all systems of belief ―must be kept squared with experience.‖106 This 
commitment to ―radical‖ empiricism does not, however, make pragmatism 
 
 
 95. Id. at 35. 
 96. Willard van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, 
supra note 87, at 20, 42. 
 97. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 43. Accord, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, 
at 122 (―[A]ltho [sic] the stubborn fact remains that there is a sensible flux, what is true of it seems 
from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation.‖). 
 98. See, e.g., JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 117 (―[T]o an unascertainable extent our 
truths are man-made products. . . .‖); id. at 119 (―[T]he form and order in which the whole [of reality] 
is cast is flagrantly man-made.‖); DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 30 
(―[O]bjects of knowledge in their capacity of distinctive objects of knowledge are determined by 
intelligence.‖); Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, supra note 96, at 42 (―The totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws 
of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric.‖). 
 99. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 134 (1981). 
 100. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 42. 
 101. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 125. 
 102. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM, supra note 63, at 35. 
 103. Id. at 42. 
 104. GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT 131 (Prometheus Books 2002) 
(1932). 
 105. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY, supra note 99, at 134. 
 106. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, supra note 96, at 45. 
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a philosophy that spurns concepts. Experience tenders new material to us 
daily. Were we to live only with the ―crude flux of our merely feeling-
experience,‖107 the horizon of our life would remain ―so narrow[]. . . as in 
the long run to defeat itself.‖108 Pragmatism recognizes this and ―rejoice[s] 
that general terms are with us.‖109 It embraces concepts as ―endlessly 
serviceable‖ and ―useful substitutes for the overfulness of the facts,‖110 
substitutes that provide ―a magnificent sketch-map for showing us our 
bearings.‖111 
Conceptual systems thus possess great pragmatic value. They permit us 
to ―harness up reality . . . in order to drive it the better.‖112 By combining 
concepts originating in ―the sensible flux of the past,‖ 113 we craft systems 
that allow us to interact with one another, anticipate experiences to come, 
and live under the order and direction of general rules. Valuable as they 
may be, systems of abstract concepts do not take us to a higher level of 
truth or reality.
114
 Concepts may provide a valuable ―straightening of the 
 
 
 107. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 217. 
 108. DEWEY, HOW WE THINK, supra note 73, at 139. Accord Willard van Orman Quine, Identity, 
Ostension, and Hypostasis, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, supra note 87, at 65, 77 (noting that 
without general terms and concepts ―language would be impossible. . ., and thought would come to 
very little.‖). 
 109. Quine, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, supra note 108, at 77. 
 110. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 109. Accord id. at 82 (abstract concepts 
are ―genuinely useful‖); JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 108 (―[Concepts] 
enlarge and prolong the perceptual experience which they envelop. . . .‖); JAMES, A PLURALISTIC 
UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 217 (―[T]he advantages [of concepts] are endless.‖); id. at 247 (―Sensible 
reality is too concrete to be entirely manageable. . . . But with our faculty of abstracting and fixing 
concepts we are there in a second. . . .‖); JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 33 (―[Concepts are 
of] great use . . . [in] summariz[ing] old facts and . . . lead[ing] to new ones.‖); id. at 88 (concepts are 
―colossally useful‖). See also DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 86 
(―[A]bstraction is indispensable if one experience is to be applicable in other experiences.‖); DEWEY, 
HOW WE THINK, supra note 73, at 144 (―Every human being has both capabilities [of concrete and 
abstract thinking], and every individual will be more effective and happier if both powers are 
developed in easy and close interaction with each other.‖). 
 111. JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 100. Accord id.at 108 
(―Perception prompts our thought, and thought in turn enriches our perception.‖); JAMES, A 
PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 217 (―[Concepts provide] a far more efficient handling of a 
given bit of experience. . . .‖); id. at 235 (concepts serve as an invaluable tool ―to lay hold of our 
experiences and to co-ordinate them withal.‖). 
 112. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 248. Accord DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION 
IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 86 (―Abstraction is liberation.‖); DEWEY, HOW WE THINK, supra 
note 73, at 139 (―[Abstract thinking] is necessary . . . to the emancipation of practical life.‖). 
 113. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 246. Accord DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION 
IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 87 (―Abstraction and generalization have always been . . . close kin. 
. . . Abstraction sets free some factor so that it may be used. Generalization is the use.‖); Quine, 
Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, supra note 108, at 77–79 (discussing how our conceptual 
mechanisms allow for effective communication, thought, and prediction). 
 114. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 84, 109. Accord id. at 110 (stating that 
abstract concepts are ―less real, not more real‖ than concrete percepts); JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:213 
 
 
 
 
tangle of our experience‘s immediate flux and sensible variety,‖115 but 
they remain just thin ―[hu]man-made extracts from the temporal flux,‖116 
portraying nothing more than ―bare abstract outline[s]‖117 of that 
phenomenal, experiential realm from which they were drawn. 
C. Instrumentalism 
Not only is the empirical world chaotic and discontinuous, but from the 
standpoint of pragmatism is it also bereft of value. Nothing we perceive in 
the undifferentiated flux of experience is, in itself, good or bad. Nothing 
there is true or false. Everything simply is.
118
 Only by virtue of our acts of 
perception, rational reflection, and concept formation does that ―primal 
stuff‖ of our immediate experience come to have any value, including 
truth value. Reflecting on experience, evaluating consequences, and 
marking points of commonality and consistency so as to craft general rules 
and concepts not only enables us to straighten the tangle of the primordial 
world but it empowers us to give meaning and value to the intrinsically 
undifferentiated and nameless. Conceptual thinking is thus critical for 
human life in that it permits a deeper understanding and adds value to the 
flux of concrete particulars presented to us in experience.
119
 This value 
added by the rational process of concept formation leads us to the third 
critical theme of pragmatism, its instrumental aspect. 
Pragmatic instrumentalism affirms the contingent nature of meaning 
and truth. In the words of John Dewey, ―meanings are indispensable 
instrumentalities of reflection‖120—not mere attributes of reference, but 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 97 (―[C]oncepts . . . must never be treated . . . as if they gave a deeper 
quality of truth. The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience.‖); JAMES, A 
PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 218 (concepts are not ―a superior type of being‖); id. at 252 
(conceptual knowledge is ―more superficial‖ than bare empirical knowledge); DEWEY, HOW WE 
THINK, supra note 73, at 142 (―Nor is theoretical thinking a higher type of thinking than practical.‖). 
 115. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 87. 
 116. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 65, at 218. Accord JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS 
OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 97 (―[T]hin extracts from perception . . . .‖). 
 117. JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 84, at 99. Accord JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 141 (―[S]keletonized abstraction[s]‖). 
 118. See JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 106 (―Realities are not true, they are; 
and beliefs are true of them.‖); JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 108 (―Truths emerge from 
facts. . . . The ‗facts‘ themselves . . . are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs 
that start and terminate among them.‖); id. at 117 (―[T]he first part of reality . . . is the flux of our 
sensations. Sensations are forced upon us. . . . They are neither true nor false; they simply are.‖). 
 119. See, e.g., DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 73, at 86 (describing how 
abstract thinking allows us to gain instructive value from concrete experiences). 
 120. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 46. 
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ascriptions of ―value, importance.‖121 So too is ―truth.‖ The reflective 
construction of a belief-set of coherent, consistent truths is a practical 
cognitive activity of signal value. Truth, quite simply, ―is profitable to our 
lives.‖122 We value it because it is ―helpful in life‘s practical struggles.‖123 
Truth is something that, ―when given, . . . leads to desirable 
consequences‖124 and, when possessed, gives satisfaction—―that specific 
truth-satisfaction, compared with which all other satisfactions are the 
hollowest humbug.‖125 In the famous words of William James, ―„[t]he 
true,‟ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our 
thinking.‖126 
To James, we can aptly characterize truth in this instrumental sense as 
―essentially an affair of leading.‖127 He reasoned: 
The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of 
fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities that can 
be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that tell us which of 
them to expect count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of 
verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. 
The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is 
only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. . . . The 
 
 
 121. Id. at 311. 
 122. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. Accord JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra 
note 72, at 47 (―Absolute or no absolute, the concrete truth for us will always be that way of thinking 
in which our various experiences most profitably combine.‖). 
 123. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. Accord, DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90 (describing the instrumental value of truth in terms of 
―demonstrated capacity for . . . guidance‖ out of situations of trouble and perplexity); HILARY 
PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION 73 (1995) (arguing that, for pragmatism, inquiry toward 
the attainment of knowledge has ―instrumental‖ value in that it ―helps us achieve. . . practical goals‖). 
See generally HARVEY CORMIER, THE TRUTH IS WHAT WORKS: WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, AND 
THE SEED OF DEATH 25–31 (2001) (discussing how James finds the practical value of truth in its 
propensity toward making our lives better). 
 124. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 318. Accord WILLIAM JAMES, 
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 344 (1902) (describing beliefs as ―rules for action‖ whose 
significance lies in their ―practical consequences‖). Cf. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, 
supra note 74, at 90 (arguing that truth is confirmed in consequences). 
 125. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 105–06. Accord DEWEY, 
RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90 (describing truth in terms of satisfaction). 
 126. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 106. Accord id. at 111 (―[C]oncrete truths . . . need 
be recognized only when their recognition is expedient.‖); JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra 
note 72, at 127–28 ([I]n the long run the true is the expedient in the way of our thinking. . . .‖). 
 127. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 103. Accord id. at 101 (―[T]ruth again is an affair of 
leading.‖); id. at 104 (―Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of 
leading. . . .‖). 
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practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the 
practical importance of their objects to us.
128
 
Pragmatically understood, truth quite profoundly is indeed ―an affair of 
leading.‖ Truth has ―practical value‖ insofar as it leads us to objects and 
ideas that hold ―practical importance‖ for our lives.129 Truth, writ large, is 
that which leads us to ―whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 
belief.‖130 True ideas are whatever ―work[s] satisfactorily‖131 by leading to 
―good consequences.‖132 The possession of truth, as James put it, is not an 
end in itself, but an end instrumental—practical and purposive, satisfying 
and good for human life. 
Yet it is crucial to note that the ―satisfaction‖ and ―good consequences‖ 
here involved are not personal, material, or emotive.
133
 The satisfaction is 
intellectual; the good consequences are those of beneficial, harmonious 
interaction with the phenomenal particulars of experiential life.
134
 
Propositions are true to the degree they satisfy our vital interest in owning 
a conception of reality that assembles a set of beliefs that fit together 
coherently, harmoniously, and with logical consistency.
135
 James stated 
that: 
The ―satisfaction‖ . . . is no abstract satisfaction überhaupt, felt by 
an unspecified being, but . . . such satisfactions (in the plural) as 
concretely existing men actually do find in their beliefs. . . . [W]e 
find that to believe in other men‘s minds, in independent physical 
realities, in past events, in eternal logical relations, is satisfactory. 
We find hope satisfactory. We often find it satisfactory to cease to 
doubt. Above all we find consistency satisfactory, consistency 
between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental 
equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of 
 
 
 128. Id. at 98. 
 129. See, e.g., JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, supra note 124, at 344 
(―Beliefs, in short, are rules for action. . . . If there were any part of a thought that made no difference 
in the thought‘s practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought‘s 
significance.‖). 
 130. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. Accord DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL 
LOGIC, supra note 22, at 318 (―[O]ur duty to pursue ‗truth‘ is conditioned upon its leading to objects 
which upon the whole are valuable.‖). 
 131. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 120. 
 132. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 319. 
 133. See DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY, supra note 99, at 134 (―[W]e are trying to . . . 
construct a representation of the world which has the characteristics of being instrumentally 
efficacious, coherent, comprehensive, and functionally simple.‖). 
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our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of 
previously acquired truths.
136
  
When it comes to truth, pragmatism thus sees ―[t]he trail of the human 
serpent . . . over everything.‖137 Reflective knowing as a search for truth is 
a practical undertaking because how we perceive, interpret, classify, and 
order the external world depends upon our specifically human interests 
and purposes.
138
 Truth satisfies insofar as it works toward accommodating 
those purposes and interests.
139
 Given that the outside world is often 
menacing, presenting us with objects we did not make and laws of nature 
we cannot avoid, we strive for truth not casually with hollow indifference, 
but so as to settle questions that meaningfully impact our lives and future 
conduct.
140
 Possessing a coherent, consistent set of true beliefs ―is 
instrumental to gaining control in a troubled situation.‖141 Holding fast to a 
conceptual system that comprehensively encases reality ―is instrumental to 
a control of the environment.‖142 Truth, instrumentally speaking, thus 
exerts great ―practical . . . force.‖143 
To regard truth as instrumental and practical in this sense is not to 
suggest, however, that reality is whatever we fancy. While pragmatism 
posits reality as we conceive it to be a product of our own human creation, 
 
 
 136. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 104–05. Accord id. at 58 (―[I]ntellectual 
satisfaction [involves]. . . matters of consistency—. . . of actually felt consistency among judgments, 
objects, and habits of reacting, in the mind‘s own experienceable world.‖); PRAGMATISM, supra note 
21, at 104 (―Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste 
included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious 
claimant.‖). 
 137. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 37. 
 138. See DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 73, at 39 (―If we had no desires and no 
purposes, then, . . . one state of things would be as good as any other.‖); JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra 
note 21, at 117 (―Human motives sharpen all our questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our 
answers, all our formulas have a human twist.‖); id. at 122 (―[W]e carve out everything, just as we 
carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes.‖). 
 139. See, e.g., DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90–91; JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 131; PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION, supra note 
123, at 73. 
 140. See, e.g., DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 30 (―[I]ntelligence is 
not an otiose affair, nor yet a mere preliminary to a spectator-like apprehension of terms and 
propositions.‖). 
 141. Id. at 17. 
 142. Id. at 30. Accord id. at 332 (―A knowing as an act is instrumental to the resultant controlled 
and more significant situation.‖); DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90 
(―[I]deas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, and systems are instrumental to an active 
reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity. . . .‖); 
PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION, supra note 123, at 70 (describing pragmatist inquiry as 
goal-directed toward ―cooperative human interaction with an environment‖). 
 143. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 17. 
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it further assumes there to be a ―standing reality independent of the idea 
that knows it,‖144 such that our conception of reality reflects ―discovered 
facts‖145 which are ―found, not manufactured.‖146 The control we try to 
garner over the outside world through rational inquiry and concept 
formation is thus highly purposive and practical, directed toward 
ourselves, not the objects we experience and posit as real. The purpose 
behind striving for knowledge is to adopt ―standpoints, attitudes, and 
methods of behaving toward facts‖147 that will help us develop the 
―practical . . . future responses which an object requires of us or commits 
us to.‖148 As James put it, ―[t]hose thoughts are true which guide us to 
beneficial interaction with sensible particulars as they occur.‖149 The 
instrumental value of truth, that is, arises from how effectively our ideas, 
concepts, and beliefs lead us to beneficial consequences in the practical 
circumstances of daily life. 
D. Workability and the Evolutionary Growth of Knowledge 
Corollary to the first three tendencies—non-absolutism, radical 
empiricism, and instrumentalism—pragmatism adopts an evolutionary 
stance toward knowledge and truth. Far from fixed and absolute for all 
time, our conceptions of reality are ever ―still in the making.‖150 
Everything we posit about reality is true only provisionally, subject to 
correction and revision on the basis of further experience and inquiry.
151
 
The experiential flux is unremitting in presenting us with new facts and 
 
 
 144. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 88. See also id. at 117 (―[The] notion of a 
reality independent of . . . us . . . lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth.‖); JAMES, 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 111 (suggesting that we have a ―duty to agree with reality,‖ a duty 
―seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete expediencies‖); DEWEY, ESSAYS IN 
EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 237 (―[W]hat makes a man‘s idea of his environment true is 
its agreement with the actual environment . . . .‖). While pragmatism accepts a standing reality 
independent of our thoughts, it insists that we can never have knowledge of that reality apart from our 
ideas of it. How we conceive it depends on the interests, problems, and purposes that stimulate our 
perception and reflection. Hence, while according to pragmatism reality exists independently of us, 
nothing is ever true in a purely objective sense. See JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 37. 
 145. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 43 (―[T]he brute objective facts 
of scientific discovery are discovered facts.‖). Cf. id. at 55 (―[A]ll meanings are derived from things 
which antedate suggestion—or thinking or ‗consciousness . . . .‘‖). 
 146. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 117. 
 147. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 332. 
 148. Id. at 309 (emphasis omitted). Cf. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 73, at 39 
(―Such considerations point to the conclusion that the ultimate ground of the quest for cognitive 
certainty is the need for security in the results of action.‖). 
 149. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 51 (emphasis in original and added). 
 150. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 123 (emphasis added). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 81, 108; PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY, supra note 99, at 134–35. 
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information to fit and assimilate into the general stock of truths that form 
our conceptions of reality. Matters of questionable fit that defy 
assimilation stimulate further inquiry and investigation, providing 
opportunities for the growth of more coherent, workable, and satisfying 
systems of belief. 
Reality and truth thus grow and evolve, according to pragmatism, ever 
toward greater coherence, consistency, and comprehensiveness. This holds 
true for all aspects of reality. Our systems of belief undergo agitation, 
revision, even wholesale realignment in the conceptual realm just as in the 
domain of the physical concrete particulars we cull from the flux of 
experience. Not infrequently we articulate new concepts while modifying, 
amending, or discarding the old, always with a view toward framing more 
workable conceptual structures. Quite simply, say the pragmatists, in the 
realm of concepts and ideas ―no point of view can ever be the last one.‖152 
Conceptual growth and change always begins, on the pragmatist 
account, when some part of our set of previously accepted beliefs comes 
under challenge. The challenge may be factual (encountering facts 
inconsistent with our beliefs), social (meeting people who reject them), or 
logical (recognizing logical incoherence or contradictions within our belief 
set). When such challenges arise, they stimulate, in James‘s language, ―an 
inward trouble to which [our] mind till then had been a stranger. . . .‖153 
Such inward trouble—doubt or uncertainty—necessitates the 
reconsideration of our set of conceptual beliefs.
154
 Yet pragmatists caution 
that reconsideration seldom leads to wholesale revision. For when 
compelled to reexamine our concepts, ideas, or opinions, ―we are all 
extreme conservatives.‖155 The ―first principle‖ in the process of 
conceptual reformulation is loyalty to our collection of previously 
accepted beliefs and concepts; indeed, James insisted that ―in most cases it 
is the only principle.‖156 Under most circumstances, we are so committed 
to our conceptual status quo that our response to challenges that would 
require serious readjustment of our previous beliefs ―is to ignore them 
altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.‖157 
Only when neither avoidance nor abuse is possible do we submit to 
conceptual rearrangement. Even then, the new ideas or concepts we are 
 
 
 152. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 55. 
 153. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 35. 
 154. See DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 199 (―Deliberation has its 
beginning in troubled activity.‖). 
 155. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 35. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
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most likely to entertain are those that we ―can graft upon the ancient stock 
[of truths] with a minimum of disturbance.‖158 New ideas thus assume a 
mediative role. We formulate them so far as possible as workable 
postulates that reconcile satisfactorily the new truth and the ancient stock. 
A new idea or concept ―makes itself true,‖ James argued, ―by the way it 
works; grafting itself then upon the ancient body of truth, which thus 
grows.‖159 He continued: 
[A] new idea . . . adopted as . . . true . . . preserves the older stock of 
truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough 
to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as 
familiar as the case leaves possible. . . . The most violent 
revolutions in an individual‘s beliefs leave most of his old order 
standing. . . . New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of 
transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a 
minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. . . . But success in 
solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. We 
say this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that 
theory; but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and 
individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently.
160
 
New concepts and ideas thus come to be regarded as true, pragmatically 
speaking, to the extent they satisfactorily fuse fresh experience or ways of 
seeing onto the previous stock of our beliefs. To established truths we hold 
tight. When conceptual reformulation cannot be avoided, we endeavor to 
assimilate the new and the old, with ―a minimum of jolt, a maximum of 
continuity.‖ Yet any jolt disrupts continuity. Every conceptual 
reformulation entails change. Thus, the process of concept formation and 
reformation, pragmatically understood, binds the two ends of the 
pragmatic method: its non-absolutist tendency with its insistence that truth 
grows. Concepts and ideas are never fixed, absolute, and settled for all 
time, but are dynamic, growing, and evolving interpretations of life, ever 
in the making. 
 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 36. 
 160. Id. at 35. 
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IV. RESULT-ORIENTATION AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Charge Against Legal Pragmatism 
It is against the backdrop of these themes—non-absolutism, radical 
empiricism, instrumentalism, and workability and the evolutionary growth 
of knowledge—that inquiry into whether pragmatism presents a result-
oriented methodology should proceed. The assumption made by many 
legal scholars that it is result-oriented, at least as applied to law, comes 
from two directions. 
First, several prominent legal theorists criticize legal pragmatism for its 
alleged lack of theoretic integrity. Luban, as noted earlier,
161
 argues that 
the pragmatist perceives no inherent value in well-reasoned, consistent 
legal doctrine but will favor nearly anything in judicial decisionmaking 
that appears instrumental to achieving outcomes conducive to the ―well-
being of the community.‖162 Dworkin likewise sees pragmatism as a 
disturbing approach to law that encourages judges to decide cases 
according to whatever they deem ―best for the community‘s future with no 
regard for past practice as such.‖163 Morgan Cloud agrees. Pragmatism, he 
contends, admonishes judges to ―base decisions on the consequences. . . , 
the result, that is ‗best.‘‖164 Given pragmatism‘s vague guidance in 
evaluating outcomes, Cloud worries that it ―leaves judges adrift in 
individual cases . . . to make ad hoc decisions based upon their subjective 
beliefs about social needs.‖165 Brian Tamanaha concurs that pragmatism 
depreciates the virtues of certainty and predictability in judicial reasoning, 
thereby threatening to undermine the rule of law.
166
 In a similar vein, 
Anthony E. Cook charges pragmatism with impoverishing normative 
discourse in law. Cook perceives pragmatism as offering a jurisprudence 
of doubt
167
 that reduces adjudication to a ―crude experimentalism,‖168 
where determining the ―right answer‖ in cases at law becomes ―merely a 
question of which consequences one finds most desirable.‖169 
 
 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 10–13. 
 162. Luban, supra note 10, at 43. 
 163. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 6, at 21. Accord DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra 
note 4, at 95. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18. 
 164. Cloud, supra note 6, at 212–13 (footnote omitted). 
 165. Id. at 214. 
 166. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note 6, at 129–30. 
 167. See Cook, supra note 5, at 1444. 
 168. Id. at 1445. 
 169. Id. at 1447. For a similar critique, see Morris, supra note 4, at 2–5, 12–17. 
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Theoretical crudity, however, does not besmirch legal pragmatism in 
the eyes of all who see it as a result-oriented jurisprudence. A second 
group of legal scholars favors or tries to appropriate legal pragmatism 
precisely because of its supposed consequentialist leanings. Most 
prominent among these scholars is Richard Posner. For Judge Posner, 
pragmatism offers a ―forward-looking‖170 approach to adjudication 
centered on the pithy criterion that judges should strive to craft ―the most 
reasonable decision‖ under the circumstances.171 By the term forward-
looking Posner means that pragmatism focuses judicial decision-making 
on the present and future, with no obligation to abide by past decisions or 
previously settled rules.
172
 He insists that such an approach is not 
consequentialist in the sense of being tied to a consequential norm like the 
principle of utility.
173
 Still, Posner embraces pragmatism under a robustly 
result-oriented understanding.
174
 He celebrates pragmatic adjudication 
because he sees it foremost as a method that comprehends the end of 
judging as achieving the ―best results.‖175 
While Posner is the most prominent proponent, he is not alone in 
favoring legal pragmatism under the belief that it comprises a result-
 
 
 170. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 60, 71–73; POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 252–53, 261; POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 20, at 11. 
 171. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 64, 337. Accord id. at 73 
(―[T]he judge should try to make the decision that is reasonable in the circumstances, all things 
considered.‖) (internal quotations omitted). 
 172. See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 40, 247–48; POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 71, 253; POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL 
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 241–42. 
 173. E.g., POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 59–60, 65–71, 78, 
337. But see POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 40 (―Pragmatism bears a family 
resemblance to utilitarianism . . . .‖); id. at 80–81, 254 (likening pragmatism to rule-utilitarianism). 
 174. See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 40 (describing his ―pragmatic 
theory of judicial behavior‖ as one of ―basing judgments (legal or otherwise) on consequences. . . .‖); 
id. at 238 (―The core of legal pragmatism is . . . heightened judicial concern for consequences‖); 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 82 (―The pragmatic approach 
permits the judge to pry open the closed area,. . . somewhat unsettling the law in order to achieve some 
immediate practical goal.‖); id. at 85 (characterizing the ―core of pragmatic adjudication‖ as ―a 
disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences‖) (internal quotations omitted); 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 241 (maintaining that 
pragmatists evaluate legal systems by the results produced); POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 
20, at 400 (―In approaching . . . interpretation, pragmatists will ask which of the possible resolutions 
has the best consequences, all things that lawyers are or should be interested in considered . . . . ‖). 
 175. E.g., POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 241–
42, 249, 262, 265. Accord POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 40 (―In law, pragmatism 
refers to basing a judicial decision on the effects the decision is likely to have . . . .‖); POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 82 (―[T]here are few if any cases in which 
consequential considerations could not possibly be decisive.‖). 
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oriented jurisprudence. Melissa Armstrong follows Posner in analogizing 
legal pragmatism to rule-utilitarianism.
176
 According to Armstrong, so-
called ―rule pragmatism‖ provides a ―first-order version of pragmatism 
because the judge has in mind the best possible results when deciding 
cases.‖177 Daria Roithmayr promotes what she calls ―radical pragmatism‖ 
because it could ―produce a useful outcome‖ for members of 
disempowered communities.
178
 John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport 
offer what they claim to be a pragmatic argument in favor of originalism 
in constitutional interpretation.
179
 They turn to pragmatism because it 
allegedly ―has the essential virtue of ensuring that the consequences of 
legal decisions will be good.‖180 Lael Daniel Weinberger, after first 
shunning pragmatism as an unprincipled, ―results-oriented approach‖ to 
constitutional interpretation,
181
 then tries to appropriate it in order to 
―trick‖182 judges and scholars into a ―substantial change in Establishment 
Clause analysis.‖183 
While these legal scholars call what they criticize or favor 
―pragmatism,‖ the result-oriented methodologies they discuss really have 
little to do with pragmatist philosophy or any fair account of pragmatist 
jurisprudence. This becomes clear by comparing the method of 
pragmatism with the mindset of jurisprudential result-orientation. Just as 
utilitarianism provides a suitable prototype of result-orientation in ethical 
theory, so too does it provide an apt model for result-oriented legal theory. 
B. Utilitarian Jurisprudence 
As is well known, Jeremy Bentham designed utilitarianism primarily as 
a theory of social and legal morality, not one of personal ethics. Most of 
his major writings, including half of his seminal The Principles of Morals 
and Legislation,
184
 address law, especially the contours of constitutional 
government,
185
 and the shape of a just system of criminal punishment.
186
 
 
 
 176. Melissa Armstrong, Rule Pragmatism: Theory and Application to Qualified Immunity 
Analysis, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 107, 107–10, 112–14 (2004). 
 177. Id. at 116. 
 178. Roithmayr, supra note 8, at 949. 
 179. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 8, at 917. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Weinberger, supra note 19, at 411. 
 182. Id. at 415. 
 183. Id. at 414. 
 184. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1781). 
 185. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL CODE (c. 1830); JEREMY BENTHAM, A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776). 
 186. See BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 184, at 170–336. 
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For over two centuries now, numerous legal theorists have sought to 
expand on Bentham‘s work by developing comprehensive conceptions of 
law atop a utilitarian foundation. John Austin was the first, weaving a 
decidedly utilitarian thread into his otherwise anormative jurisprudence of 
legal positivism.
187
 Austin argued that the principle of utility ―not only 
ought to guide, but . . . has usually been the principle consulted in making 
laws.‖188 John Stuart Mill likewise rested his influential defense of liberty 
and individual freedom on a utilitarian foundation.
189
 
Paradigmatic and illustrative of the method of utilitarian jurisprudence 
are the more recent legal philosophies of François Gény and Richard 
Wasserstrom. Gény was one of the leading exponents of the early 
twentieth century European free law or free legal decision movement in 
jurisprudence.
190
 He argued that two ideals—justice and social utility—
form the ―ultimate standard‖ for adjudication.191 On his account, judicial 
decision-making is best understood as free and scientific: ―free, because 
no positive outward authority compels [the judge] to decide as he does; . . . 
scientific, because it finds its solid foundations in nothing but the objective 
elements which legal science must reveal to him.‖192 In searching for 
objective elements in, as he put it, ―the nature of things,‖193 Gény 
identified the ―two great guide-posts‖ of justice and general utility as the 
factors toward which all law, judicial and legislative, should aim.
194
 While 
he acknowledged that these ideals amount to somewhat ―empty forms,‖195 
Gény nevertheless insisted that the only sound justification for a legal rule 
is that it ―aims at promoting justice and . . . the welfare of the greater 
number.‖196 
The American philosopher Richard Wasserstrom took a similar 
approach in his 1961 book, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of 
Legal Justification. Wasserstrom there set forth a ―‗two-level‘ logic‖197 for 
 
 
 187. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 37–63, 74–118 
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1954) (1832). 
 188. Id. at 59. 
 189. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 122–23, 130, 143–44 (Broadview 1999) (1859). 
 190. See François Gény, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Necessity and Method, in SCIENCE OF 
LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 1 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register 
trans., 1917). See generally Douglas Lind, Free Legal Decision and the Interpretive Re-Turn in 
Modern Legal Theory, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 159, 176–86 (1993). 
 191. Gény, supra note 175, at 4, 14. 
 192. Id. at 5. 
 193. Id. at 8, 11, 14. 
 194. Id. at 14. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 4, 14. 
 197. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL 
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adjudication centered on a ―careful restricted utilitarianism.‖198 He 
described his ―two-level procedure of legal justification‖199 as requiring, 
first, that ―courts are to justify their decisions by appealing to legal 
rules‖200 and, second, that they are to select those rules ―by appealing to 
the principle of utility.‖201 That is to say, Wasserstrom prescribed a fixed 
rule of decision for courts where ―the legal rule that is to be used to justify 
the particular decision would itself have to be justified on utilitarian 
grounds.‖202 
To illustrate his two-level procedure, Wasserstrom presented a 
hypothetical mortgage hardship case.
203
 Imagine a filthy rich mortgagor 
intent on foreclosing and evicting, in the cold of winter, a destitute widow 
with six children from their old, dilapidated farm. Human sympathy would 
call for equity to intervene. Wasserstrom disagreed. Arguing against an 
equitable decision rule that would consider only how the decision would 
impact the litigants before the court, he insisted, pursuant to the first prong 
of his two-level procedure, that it be adjudged according to some general 
legal rule. The challenge for a court considering the widow‘s request for 
forbearance is to craft a ―rule of law that effects a balance‖204 between the 
social value of giving special treatment to widows as a class of mortgagees 
and the considerable social utility of maintaining a viable institution of 
mortgage lending that engenders trust in mortgagors and mortgagees 
alike.
205
 Throughout, the crafting of this decision rule must turn on the 
second prong, that calling for appeal to the principle of utility.
206
 
Wasserstrom explained: 
The practice of deciding particular mortgage cases by considering 
only the consequences of the decision to the litigants is more likely 
to result in undesirable consequences of a more serious and far-
reaching nature than is the practice of deciding particular cases by 
 
 
JUSTIFICATION 122 (1961). 
 198. Id. at 138. The two-level restricted utilitarianism Wasserstrom advanced is essentially what is 
commonly called ―rule-utilitarianism.‖ See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 199. WASSERSTROM, supra note 197, at 136. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 122. 
 203. See id. at 141–44. 
 204. WASSERSTROM, supra note 197, at 142. 
 205. Id. at 142–43. 
 206. See id. at 142 (―Utilitarian considerations are surely crucial to the formulation of the most 
desirable rule of mortgage law.‖). 
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an appeal to that legal rule which on utilitarian grounds is deemed 
most desirable.
207
 
Wasserstrom‘s theory of judicial decision-making, like that of Gény 
before him, thus rests squarely on a utilitarian foundation and thereby 
carries the torch of result-orientation. Each of their theories treats every 
case at law as having a right outcome determinable by following a formal 
process hinging on the principle of utility. Each treats that principle as 
fixed antecedent to judicial deliberation. Their methods, offered as 
prescriptive accounts for how courts ought to decide cases, unequivocally 
identify the best overall outcome or result as the standard or ultimate 
criterion of judicial justification. Legal pragmatism is very different. 
V. DISTINGUISHING PRAGMATISM AND UTILITARIANISM 
A. Instrumentalism as Adaptation and Control 
The claim that legal pragmatism amounts to a result-oriented 
jurisprudence stems, more than anything, from a mistaken understanding 
of the instrumentalist tenor of pragmatic philosophy. As we have seen, 
pragmatism‘s perhaps most ―distinguishing trait is that it defines thought 
or intelligence by function, by work done, by consequences effected.‖208 
That is, pragmatism sees truth as valuable principally in a functional or 
instrumental sense—not valuable per se, but valuable in relation to us.209 
―Truth is made . . . [by us] in the course of experience,‖ 210 James claimed, 
and we value it because it is ―helpful in life‘s practical struggles.‖211 
Reflecting the accumulated experience of the human interface with the 
external world,
212
 ‗truth‘ is the name we assign to ―whatever proves itself 
to be good in the way of belief.‖213 In James‘s perhaps unfortunate 
wording, truth has ―cash-value‖214—i.e., ―is profitable to our lives‖215—a 
 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 31. 
 209. See id. at 318; PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION, supra note 123, at 73–74; 
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY, supra note 99, at 133–34. 
 210. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 104. 
 211. Id. at 42. Accord id. at 110 (―Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind 
of ought than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional . . . [with] concrete benefits. . . .‖). 
 212. See JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 435 (2d ed., Dover Pub. 1958) (1929). 
 213. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. 
 214. Id. at 32, 41. 
 215. Id. at 42. Accord JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 47 (―[T]he concrete 
truth for us will always be that way of thinking in which our various experiences most profitably 
combine.‖). 
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position with which Dewey fully concurred, though in less-laden 
language. In Dewey‘s terms, the significance we assign to that which we 
accept as true is, pragmatically speaking, a product of its practical ―value, 
importance.‖216 We do not pursue truth as if it were an idle affair.217 
Rather, truth matters because knowledge is ―involved in the process by 
which life is sustained and evolved.‖218 Distinguishing truth from 
falsehood matters because claims and propositions that are true can 
perform the ―active, dynamic function‖ of guiding us away from ―trouble 
and perplexity‖ toward the ―clearing up of a specific situation.‖219 False 
claims, to the contrary, fail when put to the test of accomplishing such 
beneficial work.
220
 
Now, in this instrumentalist sense, the value pragmatism assigns truth 
does indeed emphasize consequences. ―The true‖ is any belief or 
knowledge-claim that, ―when given, . . . leads to desirable 
consequences.‖221 True ideas or beliefs are those that provide 
―satisfaction‖222 by leading to ―good consequences.‖223 In law, ―the 
standard [of judgment] is found in consequences, in the function of what 
goes on socially.‖224 Still, this instrumentalist conception of truth does not 
render pragmatism a result-oriented philosophy. The satisfaction that 
matters to the pragmatist is in no sense material or preference-based, but 
intellectual satisfaction—the satisfaction that comes from possessing a set 
of beliefs that combine to form a coherent, workable, and logically 
consistent worldview.
225
 The good consequences are those that guide us to 
beneficial and harmonious interaction with the phenomenal particulars, 
including the social facts, of everyday life.
226
 
 
 
 216. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 311. 
 217. See id. at 30. 
 218. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 50. 
 219. Id. at 90. 
 220. See id. 
 221. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 318. Accord JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 127 (―[W]hen [humans] have true ideas of realities, 
consequential utilities ensue in abundance. . . .‖). 
 222. See DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90; DEWEY, EXPERIENCE 
AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 10; JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 104–07, 128–
33; JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 34–35, 120. 
 223. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 319. 
 224. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in 14 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 
115, 122 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1988) (1941). 
 225. See, e.g., DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90; JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 58, 104–05, 129–33; JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 
104; PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION, supra note 123, at 14–16. 
 226. See Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 224, at 121–22; JAMES, THE MEANING OF 
TRUTH, supra note 72, at 38, 51, 53. 
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From the standpoint of pragmatism, truth is thus instrumental or 
practical insofar as how we perceive and assimilate the outside world, 
order and reorder it, is contingent upon the problems, purposes, and 
interests we have in mind: ―[W]e carve out everything, just as we carve 
out constellations, to suit our human purposes.‖227 Truth satisfies to the 
extent that it works toward meeting those purposes.
228
 We are neither 
indifferent nor disinterested, nor even fully objective, when it comes to 
truth.
229
 We search for truth, for the most part, to gain the repose that 
accompanies successfully adapting to and attaining a degree of control 
over the external world. ―[R]eflective knowing,‖ Dewey wrote, ―is 
instrumental to gaining control‖230 over at least some tokens of the myriad 
objects not of our making and beyond our avoidance that we encounter in 
our daily forays into that outside world. Concepts and theories that explain 
and structure the world in a coherent and consistent way are enormously 
valuable as ―mental modes of adaptation to reality‖231 that prove 
―instrumental to a control of the environment.‖232 The instrumental cash-
value of truth, then, reflects how fruitfully our ideas and beliefs lead us in 
practice to beneficial consequences in this sense of epistemic adaptation 
and control. 
B. The Failed Project of Utilitarianism 
Pragmatic consideration of consequences thus involves a very different 
form of deliberation and judgment than marks the result-oriented appeal to 
consequences found in utilitarianism. Whether in its classical form as a 
moral theory or employed, as by Gény and Wasserstrom, as a justificatory 
standard for judicial decision-making, utilitarianism represents the very 
type of absolutist reasoning that pragmatism combats. Utilitarians offer up 
the principle of utility (however conceived)
233
 as the ultimate standard of 
morality or adjudication. Its supremacy as the end of action is fixed 
antecedent to deliberation in any particular ethical or adjudicative matter. 
While the specific results of utilitarian deliberation are not foregone, by 
 
 
 227. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 122. 
 228. See, e.g., DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 90; JAMES, THE 
MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 131. 
 229. See JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 37. 
 230. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 17. 
 231. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 94. 
 232. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 30. Accord DEWEY, 
EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 10–11; DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, 
supra note 74, at 89–90. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 25–42. 
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restricting the range of deliberative criteria to consequences only, 
utilitarianism does determine antecedently the direction it will lead. 
Deliberation calls only for deference to the principle of utility, assessing 
the consequences likely to follow from each alternative course of action, 
and then selecting, by deductive inference, that action which is expected to 
result in the best possible overall state of affairs. Non-consequential 
considerations do not count. Every utilitarian judgment projects the best 
possible outcome and is justified on the basis of that result-focused 
projection alone. 
To Dewey, the utilitarian method suffers so many inadequacies as to 
serve as ―a remarkable example of the need of philosophic 
reconstruction.‖234 Though he credited the utilitarians with doing much to 
advance normative thought beyond the medieval shackles of otherworldly 
authority, he regretted their failure to free it from the orthodoxy of 
absolutism.
235
 Utilitarianism was to him a ―reform movement‖236 founded 
on the ―just insight‖ that moral goodness begins and ends with humanity 
and the welfare of society.
237
 Yet by positing the principle of utility as the 
one ―fixed, final and supreme end‖ of moral inquiry, the utilitarians 
merely followed, in unquestioning imitation, the timeworn method of 
philosophical absolutism.
238
 The result was ―catastrophe.‖239 For the 
utilitarian method of defining the good in terms of future pleasures or 
satisfactions and restricting moral deliberation to an algebraic calculation 
produces an impossible standard of right conduct that only confuses and 
obscures normative inquiry.
240
 To Dewey, the hedonic ends of 
utilitarianism—pleasure, happiness, preference-satisfaction—are ―among 
the things most elusive of calculation.‖241 Despite the claims of the 
utilitarians to the contrary, those ends are incapable of commensurate 
quantification.
242
 Projecting them into an unknown future only enhances 
the indeterminacy.
243
 Hence, though he lauded utilitarianism for 
concentrating moral inquiry on social well-being, Dewey castigated it for 
 
 
 234. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 105. 
 235. See id. at 104; DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 211–13. 
 236. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 205. 
 237. Id. at 212. Accord DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 104. 
 238. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 104. 
 239. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 212. 
 240. See, e.g., id. at 202–04, 207–08, 221. See generally ABRAHAM EDEL, ETHICAL THEORY AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE: THE EVOLUTION OF JOHN DEWEY‘S ETHICS, 1908–1932, at 23–24 (2001) 
(discussing Dewey‘s criticism of the utilitarian method). 
 241. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 203. 
 242. See id. at 215–16. 
 243. See id. at 203. 
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reducing ethics to an unsightly choice ―between a sickly introspection and 
an intricate calculus of remote, inaccessible and indeterminate results.‖244 
Yet even more troubling to Dewey than utilitarianism‘s impractical 
calculus is its mistaken conception of thought and deliberation. On his 
account, the utilitarians paradoxically over-stated the role of reason and 
rationality in human conduct while at the same time diminishing the 
robustness of deliberation by reducing all judgment of action to a 
simplified calculation of quantities.
245
 This was to Dewey to confound the 
functional purpose of deliberation.
246
 For we neither act from reason nor 
reason only to calculate profits and losses, as if the whole purpose and 
value of human life could be accounted for on a business ledger.
247
 Rather, 
reason intersects with action insofar as it serves as a tool for appraising 
present possible courses of conduct.
248
 Deliberation begins in uncertainty 
and confusion over how to respond in a troublesome situation.
249
 Its 
purpose ―is to resolve entanglements in existing activity, restore 
continuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulse, and redirect habit.‖250 
We deliberate—inquire into facts and circumstances, assess habits and 
desires, ponder available courses of action—so as to achieve the 
instrumental ends of disentangling, re-harmonizing,
251
 and gaining 
―control of environment in relation to the ends of the life process.‖252 It is 
an exercise in search, experiment, and discovery.
253
 Most often it leads to 
judgments that are tentative and provisional, no more than working 
hypotheses.
254
 Never can we hope to deliberate to the end of inquiry nor 
settle upon, once and for all, the final end. For to encounter new facts and 
situations, to suffer unexpected challenges, and to stumble and fall from 
certainty is the destiny of humanity. The fashioning of ends is endless.
255
 
Deliberation is continuous: ―Even the most comprehensive deliberation 
leading to the most momentous choice only fixes a disposition which has 
to be continuously applied in new and unforeseen conditions, re-adapted 
 
 
 244. Id. at 202. 
 245. See id. at 200, 218, 221. 
 246. See id. at 218. 
 247. See, e.g., DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 199–201, 213–15, 218–
21. 
 248. See id. at 206–07. 
 249. See id. at 199, 207. 
 250. Id. at 199. 
 251. See id. at 199, 231. 
 252. John Dewey, Interpretation of Savage Mind, in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899–
1924, at 41 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976) (1902). 
 253. See DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 208, 216. 
 254. See id. at 56, 202, 208, 215; Dewey, Logical Method and Law, supra note 76, at 26. 
 255. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 74, at 232. 
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by future deliberations.‖256 Reason thus helps keep activity vital and 
growing in depth of meaning and significance.
257
 It encourages 
imaginative foresight of consequences brought into view as workable 
solutions to troubled situations.
258
 In no respect, insisted Dewey, can this 
robust process of inquiry, deliberation, and judgment be reduced to a 
shallow calculative prediction of future consequences.
259
 
Utilitarianism and pragmatism thus align only superficially. They share 
an interest in humanity, manifested in conceptions of truth and goodness 
that reference human purposes and social welfare. They each speak in 
terms of good consequences and satisfaction. Yet it is fallacious to assume 
that their common use of the terms ―social welfare,‖ ―consequences,‖ and 
―satisfaction‖ means that they use those terms in a common way. It was 
Ludwig Wittgenstein who most poignantly revealed how frequently 
misunderstandings result from the common tendency to assimilate from 
one linguistic context to another words and expressions that serve very 
different functions within each.
260
 That tendency accounts, at least in part, 
for the misunderstanding that pragmatism is result-oriented. Legal 
theorists often blend pragmatism with utilitarianism for no reason other 
than the linguistic fact that they both reference consequences, 
satisfactions, and other like terms.
261
 Yet there is no justification for 
assuming, as to any pair of theoretical structures, that common expressions 
entail the same conceptual framework. As we have seen, for utilitarianism 
and pragmatism, the functions their shared words serve are in no way 
comparable. 
C. The Confluence of Practice and Consequences  
By all accounts, utilitarianism is result-oriented. It directs all human 
conduct toward those particular results that maximize the overall social 
 
 
 256. Id. at 208. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. at 208, 215. 
 259. See, e.g., id. at 205–06. 
 260. See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN‘S LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE, 1932–1935, at 102–04 (Alice Ambrose 
ed., 2001); WITTGENSTEIN‘S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS, CAMBRIDGE, 1939 
FROM THE NOTES OF R.G. BOSANQUET, NORMAN MALCOM, RUSH RHEES, AND YORICK SMYTHIES 14 
(Cora Diamond ed., 1975). 
 261. See, e.g., DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 6, at 21, 24; Armstrong, supra note 176, 
at 109–14; Shalin, supra note 4, at 458, 462. Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law 
and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2091–95 (1996) (discussing the relationship of 
pragmatism and utilitarianism). 
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good.
262
 Very different is the consequential ―good in the way of belief‖263 
toward which pragmatism aims. It is not a formulaic, measurable good that 
calls for--or even permits--evaluative comparison of courses of action or 
sets of beliefs under the floodlight of a fixed antecedent end. Rather, it is a 
process or practice good, a way of mediating between and evaluating the 
practical worth of particular knowledge-claims or judgments and, more 
generally, of theories of knowledge or truth. In James‘s terms, 
―pragmatism [is] a mediator and reconciler . . . that . . . ‗unstiffens‘ our 
theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, 
no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She 
will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence.‖264 Rather 
than prescribing a formal method of inquiry testable by the results it 
reaches, pragmatism assumes ―an attitude of orientation,‖ specifically 
―[t]he attitude of looking away from first things, principles, „categories,‟ 
supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts.‖265 The question pragmatism ever asks is what 
practical difference to human life does it make to adopt one or another 
theory, meaning, or truth. This question goes to ―last things‖: fruits, 
consequences, and concrete facts. Yet it is not a question that finds a 
particular result fruitful or a certain consequence good because they satisfy 
some pre-conceived standard of value or goodness. The pragmatic method 
endorses ―[n]o particular results‖266 but only those outcomes that prove 
beneficial and workable in the full context of belief. 
Illustrative of pragmatism‘s non-dogmatic attitude or ―way of looking‖ 
is Dewey‘s critical appraisal of traditional metaphysics. Metaphysical 
theories typically provide non-historical, causally-based accounts of 
reality. To Dewey, such accounts tend to be unhelpful in that they offer 
little in the way of practical guidance for actually living within the realities 
supposedly revealed. Competing metaphysics often provide nothing more 
than conflicting statements about reality that are ―equally true 
descriptively; [even though] neither statement is true in the explanatory 
and metaphysical meaning imputed to it.‖267 Early in the twentieth 
century, one such idle metaphysical debate addressed the developmental 
essence of human personality and character. The question was whether the 
 
 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 25–42. 
 263. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. 
 264. Id. at 43–44. 
 265. Id. at 32. 
 266. Id. 
 267. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 273. 
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adult personality is caused by forces and patterns established in childhood, 
or whether childhood is a mere prefatory step leading to adulthood, 
conceived as an end already implicitly determined prior to the journey of 
youth. On Dewey‘s account, such metaphysical debate errs because it 
assumes reality can be explained by ―breaking up . . . a continuity of 
historical change into separate parts.‖268 To pragmatists, such atomistic 
thinking only confounds understanding, for reality is not comprised of a 
static accumulation of ahistorical isolated elements or events. Rather, as 
Dewey put it: 
The reality is the growth-process itself; childhood and adulthood are 
phases of a continuity, in which just because it is a history, the later 
cannot exist until the earlier exists. . .; and in which the later makes 
use of the registered and cumulative outcome of the earlier . . . . The 
real existence is the history in its entirety, the history as just what it 
is. The operations of splitting it up into two parts and then having to 
unite them again by appeal to causative power are equally arbitrary 
and gratuitous. Childhood is the childhood of and in a certain serial 
process of changes which is just what it is, and so is maturity.
269
 
Reality, that is, is always ―in the making‖270 and must be understood in 
practice, i.e., in the whole context of its historical development. So too 
must truth. The true holds instrumental (―cash‖) value; yet the desirable 
consequences that accompany it and the satisfaction to which it gives rise 
cannot be understood by looking only at the end-point (the result) of 
inquiry as marked by the judgment of truth. Rather, like reality, truth ―is 
[a] growth-process itself,‖ such that ―the real [truth] is the history [of 
inquiry and deliberation] in its entirety, the history as just what it is.‖271 
Focusing consequentially only on the ―function of [deliberation as] giving 
a result, and not in its character of being a process‖272 masks and obscures 
the ―phases of a continuity‖ through which knowledge grows.273 
Moreover, it clouds our understanding and depreciates the significance of 
the many intermediate truths that span those phases. As stated by James, 
―[t]he bridge of intermediaries, actual or possible, which in every real case 
 
 
 268. Id. at 275. 
 269. Id. 
 270. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 123. 
 271. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 275. 
 272. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 81. 
 273. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 275. 
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is what carries and defines the knowing, gets treated as an episodic 
complication which need not even potentially be there.‖274 
By the pragmatic method, however, both the phases of our knowing 
and the truths intermediate to the end-result receive their due regard. For 
to pragmatism, truth encompasses the whole practice of inquiry, the full 
history of ―our minds and our experiences work[ing] . . . together.‖275 Only 
by taking account of all phases, of all facts and circumstances, of all 
inferences and observations redounding across that whole continuum of 
mind and experience can we attain the true end-result of inquiry: the 
creation of ―a system—a comprehensive and orderly arrangement‖276 of 
ideas and beliefs that lead us in practice to ―desirable consequences.‖277 
Yet once again, from the standpoint of pragmatism, those 
consequences that are desirable are not those that conform with a ready-
made teleological standard. For pragmatism ―is a method only.‖278 It 
―stands for no particular results.‖279 It advances ―no dogmas, and no 
doctrines save its method.‖280 The only conclusions it endorses are those 
affirmed by mind and experience working together as likely to ―lead‖ to 
beneficial outcomes,
281
 by providing some degree of control and 
enhancing our ability to adapt and navigate through the alternatively 
useful and harmful, protective and hostile, reaffirming and challenging 
world of external objects and others that we encounter daily. Truth 
provides satisfaction insofar as it works toward articulating coherent and 
usable systems of belief that, in this practice-oriented sense of control and 
navigation, ―suit our human purposes.‖282 Here lies the ―practical value‖ 
and consequential significance of truth.
283
 And here lies likewise the 
practical value and consequential orientation of the pragmatic method. 
Thus to say, from the standpoint of pragmatism, that truth is ―whatever 
proves itself to be good in the way of belief,‖284 that true ideas are those 
 
 
 274. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 82. 
 275. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 40. 
 276. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 55. 
 277. Id. at 318. 
 278. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 31. Accord JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra 
note 72, at 37 (―[Pragmatism] only . . . indicate[s] a method of carrying on abstract discussion.‖). 
 279. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 32. Accord id. at 31 (―[Pragmatism] does not stand 
for any special results.‖). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 103. 
 282. Id. at 122. Accord JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 131. 
 283. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 98. 
 284. Id. at 42. 
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that ―work satisfactorily‖285 by leading to ―good consequences‖286 is to say 
only that true belief matters practically for the convenience, comfort, and 
security of human life. We are ever carving constellations,
287
 engrafting 
meaning, sense, and significance on realities found in the flux of 
experience. Truth is thus largely of our own making and plural. Yet not all 
belief systems are equal. The same reality can be accounted for 
differently—can be carved into various constellations. Those accounts that 
provide the most useful and coherent descriptive accounts of the found 
realities, i.e., those that lead to the good consequences of greater control, 
readier adaptation, and easier navigation, are those with the most value 
relative to our human purposes. It is those accounts we hold to be true: 
Ideas that tell us which [external objects or conditions] to expect 
count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of verification, and 
the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. . . . If I am lost in 
the woods and starved, and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of 
the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at 
the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself. . . . The 
practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the 
practical importance of their objects to us.
288
 
To pragmatism, truth is plural, but not relative; satisfying, though not 
subjective; purposive, not personal; consequential, not teleological; 
practice-oriented, never result-oriented. The outside world indulges our 
concept formation and truth-making with great tolerance. But only at risk 
of adverse consequences do we hold fast in practice to truths that ill-fit the 
concrete particulars that we confront in the external world. ―Experience 
. . . has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present 
formulas.‖289 For that reason, how we search for truth and deliberate 
toward ends is consequential, since forming true beliefs can keep us from 
being scalded. 
 
 
 285. Id. at 120. 
 286. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 319. 
 287. See JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 122. 
 288. Id. at 98. 
 289. Id. at 106. 
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VI. BENJAMIN CARDOZO AND THE PRAGMATIC PRACTICE OF COMMON 
LAW ADJUDICATION 
No better paradigm of pragmatism‘s robust instrumental process exists 
than that of the common law method of adjudication. Pragmatist thinking 
began to influence American law and jurisprudence in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries concurrent with its development as a 
recognized philosophic method. A young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
chummed with William James and C. S. Pierce, another of pragmatism‘s 
founders, in the early 1870s.
290
 Nicholas St. John Green, a notable scholar 
of tort law, introduced elements of pragmatist thought into the law by way 
of his writings on negligence.
291
 As early as 1909, a widely circulated 
series of lectures on jurisprudence described the development of legal 
principle to a generation of young lawyers in clear pragmatist fashion.
292
 
The most elegant and complete pragmatist account of common law 
adjudication came from Benjamin Cardozo. In his Yale Tanner Lectures, 
published in 1921 as The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice Cardozo 
straightforwardly embraced pragmatist thought, declaring that the ―juristic 
philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of 
pragmatism.‖293 He reaffirmed this commitment in The Growth of the 
Law.
294
 There he argued that pragmatism was ―profoundly affecting the 
development of juristic thought.‖295 No jurist since has matched Cardozo‘s 
clarity in presenting a pragmatist account of adjudication. A quick review 
of his work reveals the instrumentalist tenor of the common law method 
while countering the claim that legal pragmatism provides a result-
oriented jurisprudence. 
A. Legal Rules as Working Hypotheses, Not Absolute Postulates 
To Justice Cardozo, common law adjudication, like the philosophy of 
pragmatism, assumes a humble vision of legal truth. Just as pragmatist 
 
 
 290. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 201–05 
(2001). 
 291. See, e.g., Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201 (1870), 
reprinted in 5 KAN. CITY L. REV. 114 (1936). 
 292. See MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE (1909). 
 293. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921) (footnote 
omitted). 
 294. See BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, reprinted in SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 185 (Margaret E. Hall ed., Fallon Pub. 1947) (1924). 
 295. Id. at 242. Cf. id. at 205 (―Pragmatism is at least a working rule by which [legal] truth is to be 
tested, and its attainment known.‖) (footnote omitted). 
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philosophy rejects absolutism, Cardozo repudiated the idea that legal rules 
and principles represent ―absolute‖296 or ―final truths‖297 ready to be 
plucked by judges ―full-blossomed from the trees.‖298 Common law 
adjudication, he wrote, ―does not work from pre-established truths of 
universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them 
deductively.‖299 Rather, the process of common law inquiry is foremost an 
empirical one; its method of reasoning is mainly inductive.
300
 Rules and 
principles emerge organically in the fundamentally pragmatic process of 
case-by-case decision-making. That process depends heavily on 
experience and requires judges to assume an ―experimental‖ mindset.301 
Reminiscent of Dewey,
302
 Cardozo maintained that the rules and principles 
there derived amount to nothing more than ―working hypotheses.‖303 Each 
new case with its distinct facts and concrete circumstances presents a new 
experiment against which the hypotheses are tested and reconsidered. In 
this manner, the empirical data of the law—the rules and principles crafted 
in past decisions and stored in the law‘s ―great laboratories‖ of precedent 
and doctrine—are ―continuously retested.‖304 The rules and principles that 
work well by contributing coherently and efficiently to the welfare of 
society become reinforced and affirmed.
305
 Those that ―do not work well,‖ 
that ―work injustice,‖ are re-examined and potentially nullified and 
abandoned.
306
 
This experimental picture of the common law method fully comports 
with the philosophy of pragmatism. So does Justice Cardozo‘s insistence 
that common law judges cannot re-examine, abandon, modify, or create 
new rules or doctrines at will.
307
 Pragmatist philosophy limits the adoption 
 
 
 296. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 102. Cf. 
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 205 (stating that reality, insofar as we can 
know it, is conditioned and relative, not ―absolute and unconditioned‖). 
 297. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 23. Accord id. at 161 
(arguing that legal truths are ―less preordained and constant‖ than generally assumed). 
 298. MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE (1909), quoted in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 103. 
 299. Id. at 22. 
 300. See id. at 23. 
 301. Id. at 23. 
 302. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 303. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 23; CARDOZO, THE 
GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 218. Accord id. at 208 (―tentative hypothesis‖); id. at 216 
(―provisional hypotheses‖). 
 304. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 23. 
 305. See id. at 66–67, 73. 
 306. MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE (1909), quoted in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 23. 
 307. See id. at 103–15, 129–41; CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 204, 
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or rejection of beliefs to their rational fit and functional coherence within 
an overall practice or system of belief. Likewise, the power of common 
law adjudication is a power restrained by system and tradition, regulated 
by reason, and responsible to function.
308
 Cardozo observed that judges 
―must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom and 
the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges through 
the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innovations.‖309 
No judge enjoys the right or power ―to travel beyond the walls of the 
interstices.‖310 
Common law adjudication no more than the philosophy of pragmatism 
thus warrants the label of result-orientation. Pragmatism disavows as 
unjustified any belief that contravenes the empirical data of its origin or 
ill-fits the system of belief that serves as its destination. Common law 
judges work within precisely such a practice beholden to empirical fidelity 
and systematic coherence. Judges must confine their outcome-preferences 
and innovative skills within the interstitial walls of precedent and practice 
erected over centuries of common law practice. Still, Cardozo insisted that 
those interstitial walls do not harbor absolute legal truths immune to 
challenge or beyond rebuttal. They are the laboratory walls. The truths 
they hold within are the working hypotheses of legal rules and principles. 
Precedent and practice accordingly do not hand judges sparkling formulas 
for easy determination of outcomes. Rather, the walls of precedent and 
practice determine only the range of judicial discretion, the space of 
intellectual inquiry ―over which [judicial] choice moves.‖311 Most often 
that range is nil.
312
 Most cases are commonplace. They fit clearly and 
unambiguously within settled doctrines of law. Yet a minority of cases fall 
into gaps or unsettled areas of law. Others raise factual questions that go 
beyond the settled extension of the applicable rule of law. These cases, 
where the legal belief-set is indeterminate,
313
 comprise the small 
 
 
227–28. 
 308. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 30–31, 112, 141; 
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 206–08, 220–21, 229–33. 
 309. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 103. 
 310. Id. at 129. Accord id. at 114 (arguing that judges may not go about ―traveling beyond the 
walls of the interstices‖). 
 311. Id. at 103. 
 312. See id. at 129 (―In countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion.‖). 
Accord id. at 164 (noting that the majority of cases are ―predestined‖ in the sense that they ―could not, 
with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. The law and its application alike are 
plain.‖). 
 313. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 21. 
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percentage of cases that require the ―creative element‖ of judging314—the 
exercise of choice within the walls of practice.
315
 
B. Fitness to the End of Social Justice 
Cardozo thus perceived the creative element in adjudication as arising 
only in a special and narrow phase of judicial practice. It was a phase that 
he went on to describe in markedly pragmatist and instrumental terms. The 
pragmatist philosophers, as we have seen, stressed the functional nature of 
inquiry and truth. James argued that the standard for true belief is found in 
the ―concrete benefits‖ that follow from accepting a proposition as true.316 
Dewey maintained that the standard of judgment in law lies ―in the 
function of what goes on socially.‖317 Likewise, Cardozo insisted that law, 
including adjudication, must be understood in terms of social function.
318
 
The ―final cause‖ of law‘s very existence, he argued, is the well-being of 
society.
319
 Cases come before courts, just as matters become placed on 
legislative agendas, to reconcile troublesome situations in social life. 
While several factors rightfully influence judicial decision-making, 
including logic, history, custom, and tradition,
320
 Cardozo claimed that 
―the final principle‖ of deliberation for judges and legislators alike ―is one 
of fitness to [the] end‖ of social justice.321 To fulfill their function, judges 
must ―shape [their] judgment in obedience to the fundamental interest of 
society.‖322 
In this respect, adjudication, understood pragmatically, focuses on 
consequences. Of course it does. It is hard to fathom a jurisprudence that 
would even feign indifference toward the impact of law on society or the 
relationship between judging and justice. No jurisprudential tradition has 
ever taken such a foolhardy course. Natural law jurisprudence treats 
 
 
 314. Id. at 165; CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 208. Accord id. at 244–
47 (discussing how the judicial process sometimes becomes a ―creative agency‖ requiring ―creative 
action‖ by the courts). 
 315. See id. at 217–20 (discussing and illustrating how indeterminacy requires the exercise of 
judicial choice); id. at 247 (―[E]very doubtful decision involves a choice. . . .‖). 
 316. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 110. 
 317. Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 224, at 122. 
 318. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 103. 
 319. Id. at 66. Accord CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 220 (―[In] the 
genesis and growth of the law, . . . . social welfare is the final test . . . .‖). 
 320. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 30–31, 112, 141, 
162; THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 213–20. 
 321. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 103. Accord 
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 220, 238. 
 322. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 140. 
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benefitting the common good as a necessary condition for law.
323
 The 
philosophy of legal positivism, determinedly amoral in so many respects, 
nonetheless recognizes certain normative considerations, including the 
concept of justice and the principle of utility, as criteria affecting the 
soundness of legal norms.
324
 Popular contemporary legal theories that 
characterize the end of judicial practice in terms of integrity
325
 or 
efficiency
326
 find their theoretical justifications in consequences and the 
common good.
327
 So do theories of originalism in constitutional 
interpretation.
328
 Even Neil Duxbury‘s controversial work on the use of 
 
 
 323. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, in ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS Q. 90 
art. 2, 4, Q. 96, art. 1, Q. 97, art. 2 (William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, eds., Hackett 1988) 
(1265–1274) (arguing that it is a necessary condition and principal objective for law that it be directed 
to the common good); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 125 (1980) (identifying, 
by the law of nature, ―the requirement of favouring and fostering the common good of one‘s 
communities‖ as the basis for ―many, perhaps even most, of our concrete moral responsibilities, 
obligations, and duties‖); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO 
NATURAL LAW 35 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673) 
(―[T]he fundamental natural law is: every man ought to do as much as he can to cultivate and preserve 
sociality.‖). Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
23–24 (1998) (advocating a consequentialist, quasi-utilitarian defense of natural rights). 
 324. See, e.g., AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, supra note 187, at 37–
63, 74–118; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 153–80 (1961). 
 325. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM‘S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 10–11, 103–10, 124–29 (1996); DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 225–75. 
 326. See POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 77–79; POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 20, at 15–21, 437–43; POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra note 20, at 353–92; RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60–115 (1981). 
 327. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 225 (―[L]aw as integrity, propositions 
of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due 
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community‘s legal practice.‖); POSNER, 
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 78 (―My argument for judges‘ trying to 
decide common law cases in a way that will promote efficiency is simply that it‘s a useful thing that 
judges can do . . . .‖); POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 326, at 115 (―I have tried to 
develop a moral theory that goes beyond classical utilitarianism and holds that the criterion for judging 
whether acts and institutions are just or good is whether they maximize the wealth of society.‖). 
 328. E.g., M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION xv, 16, 130–31 (1993) (arguing that only by overcoming judicial 
distortion and honoring the Constitution as originally understood can the United States restore its 
constitutional integrity, secure liberty for future generations, and preserve its national character and 
standing among nations); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 218–19 (1999) (―[The courts] must adopt a 
jurisprudence of original intent. . . . Originalism is most capable of realizing the goals internal to the 
interpretive project itself and of actualizing the obligations of democratic constitutionalism . . . [and] 
promises to protect the Court from itself, and in so doing, to protect us from the Court.‖); McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 8, at 919–20, 925–28, 934–35 (advocating originalism in constitutional 
interpretation because it leads to better consequences than any other interpretive approach); Ralph A. 
Rossum, Constituting and Preserving the Republic, in OUR PECULIAR SECURITY: THE WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 111, 111 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Gary L. McDowell, and 
Philip J. Costopoulos eds., 1993) (claiming that recovering the original principles and ideas of the 
constitution‘s framers is essential for the preservation of the American constitutional system). 
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lotteries in legal decision-making sees recourse to sortition as justified 
only if it serves the well-being of society.
329
 It is hard to imagine a 
jurisprudential theory to the contrary. Little comfort—and even less 
common sense—would attend a theory of adjudication that pictured good 
judging in terms of disinterest in justice or indifference toward the 
common good. No one‘s ideal judge is an insensitive arbiter who does not 
care or trouble to understand how the outcomes of his or her decisions 
impact real lives or affect concrete social interests. Rather, as expressed by 
Justice Cardozo in potent pragmatist language, ―[t]he restraining power of 
the judiciary‖ is fulfilled only when judicial ―power is exercised with 
insight into social values, and with suppleness of adaptation to changing 
social needs.‖330 
C. Restraints of Practice 
Adjudication, understood pragmatically, thus constitutes a practical 
institution designed for the singular purpose of resolving conflict in a 
manner that enhances the social welfare. Yet Cardozo was quick to rebuff 
any result-oriented inferences that may be drawn from this functional end. 
Though a legal rule‘s social value determines its legitimacy,331 Cardozo 
cautioned against reducing the judicial function to a preference-based 
pursuit of short-term ends or expediency. He stated categorically: ―I do not 
mean . . . that judges are commissioned to set aside existing rules at 
pleasure in favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be 
expedient or wise.‖332 For no court may ―roam at large, and light upon one 
conclusion or another as the result of favor or caprice.‖333 Judges may 
exercise creative choice only to fill gaps or resolve indeterminacies within 
the interstitial walls of precedent and practice. Not only do they lack 
freedom to venture ―beyond the walls of the interstices,‖334 but within 
those spaces their interpretive discretion is seriously circumscribed. ―The 
judge, even when he is free,‖ Cardozo wrote, ―is still not wholly free. He 
 
 
 329. See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 145 
(1999) (―[T]he [justifiable] use of randomizing techniques [in legal decision-making would] have 
positive effects on people‘s incentives and might also, on occasions, turn out to be cost-efficient and 
(more controversially) just.‖). 
 330. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 94. 
 331. Id. at 73. Accord CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 236 (―We test the 
rule by its results.‖). 
 332. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 66–67. 
 333. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 204. 
 334. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 114. 
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is not to innovate at pleasure.‖335 Judges work within a practice which 
restricts their freedom according to criteria ―established by the traditions 
of the centuries, by the example of other judges, . . . by the collective 
judgment of the profession, and by the duty of adherence to the pervading 
spirit of the law.‖336 Within this practice, no judge is a ―knight-errant,‖ 
free to ―roam[] at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of 
goodness.‖337 
To Cardozo, and to legal pragmatism, the practice of adjudication thus 
imposes on judges restrictions that vigorously delimit the exercise of 
discretion and creative choice. These restrictions cannot, however, ―be 
staked out for [the judge] upon a chart.‖338 The practice-bound factors 
identified by Cardozo—logic, custom and tradition, history, social 
standards of right and justice
339—come to be understood by judges 
through experience in judging, as ―in the practice of an art.‖340 That 
experience brings judges to see that the mindset of result-orientation ill-
fits the practice of adjudication. Deciding cases so as to achieve short-term 
ends or to maximize outcomes in particular cases according to standards 
determined outside judicial practice contravenes the judicial function, just 
as it undermines the concept of law.
341
 For to Cardozo, one of the ―most 
fundamental social interests‖ underlying the function of judicial practice 
―is that law shall be uniform and impartial.‖342 Ad hoc, result-oriented 
decision-making vitiates that core function of law, impairing the 
fundamental need for order in social life.
343
 
Here, again, Cardozo‘s account of the common law bespeaks the 
underlying pragmatic methodology of adjudicative practice. His claim that 
the first principle of law is ―serene and impartial uniformity‖344 
corresponds to James‘s insistence that consistency is the first criterion for 
 
 
 335. Id. at 141. 
 336. Id. at 114. Accord id. at 136–37 (―Insignificant is the power of innovation of any judge, when 
compared with the bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge him on every side.‖). 
 337. Id. at 141. 
 338. Id. at 114. Accord CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 215–16 
(dismissing the ―yearning for mechanical and formal tests‖ for adjudication as grounded in ―illusion‖ 
and sure to ―carry us upon the rocks‖ if pursued). 
 339. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 112, 141, 162; 
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 213–20. 
 340. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 114. 
 341. See id. at 139–40. 
 342. Id. at 112. Accord id. at 36 (―[S]erene and impartial uniformity . . . is of the essence of the 
idea of law.‖). Cf. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 186–87, 192 (discussing 
the importance of certainty and stability for law). 
 343. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 141. 
 344. Id. at 36. 
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truth. In entertaining the truth of a proposition, James argued that we look, 
first and foremost, for ―consistency between the present idea and . . . our 
whole stock of previously acquired truths.‖345 That is, the principal test for 
adding a new idea or datum of experience to our set of true beliefs is fit 
and consistency. We strive always for the intellectual satisfaction and 
repose that comes from possessing a belief-set that coheres internally as 
well as with the external facts of experience. 
D. The Virtue and Limits of Stare Decisis 
From this, it follows that, on a pragmatic account of adjudication, 
following precedent is the first principle and starting-point for judicial 
decision-making. Adherence to precedent, Cardozo argued, must be the 
rule in common law adjudication, not the exception.
346
 Only through the 
general following of precedent—through ―symmetry and logic in the 
development of legal rules‖347—does the common law achieve a degree of 
uniformity and impartiality. In addition to the general repose those 
fundamental social interests afford, following precedent further serves the 
principle of fairness and secures ―faith in the even-handed administration 
of justice.‖348 
Cardozo thus firmly cautioned against marring the symmetry of law 
―by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and artificial 
exceptions unless for some sufficient reason.‖349 Stare decisis, he 
maintained, is the presumptive ―everyday working rule of our law.‖350 Yet 
sometimes in law, as in life, our settled beliefs face challenges sufficient to 
compel their reconsideration. The rules and principles that comprise the 
common law‘s working hypotheses are neither singular nor simplistic. 
They form ―complex bundles‖351 of truths born in social experience and 
―carry[ing] throughout their lives the birthmarks of their origin.‖352 
Pursuing the virtue of consistency on occasion becomes an exercise in 
resolving conflicts between competing lines of precedent or reconciling 
inconsistencies arising when loyalty to the adjudicative criteria of logic, 
 
 
 345. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 105. 
 346. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 34, 149. 
 347. Jacobs & Young, Inc., 230 N.Y. 239, 242, quoted in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 44.  
 348. Id. at 34. 
 349. Id. at 33. 
 350. Id. at 20. 
 351. Id. at 64. 
 352. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 216. 
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history, custom, and tradition lead in different or equivocal directions.
353
 
Such unsettling occasions of trouble in the legal environment require 
courts to exercise their residual power of creative choice.
354
 No one 
criterion of adjudicative practice overrides all others.
355
 Still, Cardozo 
insisted that in the exercise of creative choice, judges must defer to the 
―final cause of law‖: social justice.356 When genuine conflict or ambiguity 
makes it uncertain ―how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted,‖ 
courts must turn to considerations of fundamental justice and the social 
good to ―fix the path, its direction and its distance.‖357 
Adherence to precedent, while the first principle of adjudication, is thus 
defeasible. To be healthy, law, like truth, must grow along lines of reason 
and the social good. For the most part, the law‘s historical growth is silent 
and unconscious, reflecting the customary morality of a people over 
time.
358
 Yet Cardozo maintained that much of the law‘s most significant 
historical development occurs through ―conscious or purposed growth.‖359 
The occasions for such purposive growth are those troubling occurrences 
of conflict or ambiguity in the extension of a legal rule. In resolving those 
cases, the judicial focus sometimes must shift from ―the particular to the 
universal,‖360 i.e., from the narrow concerns of the parties in the individual 
case to the larger and more vital social interests at stake.
361
 Precedent cases 
that stand opposed to the welfare of society must yield, Cardozo argued, to 
that fundamental end.
362
 
Hence, the question of whether to honor the doctrine of stare decisis or 
set out on a new path presents to jurisprudence a most ―vexed and 
perplexing problem.‖363 While adherence to precedent is the ―everyday 
working rule‖364 of common law adjudication, it is not a rigid, inflexible 
judicial imperative. Adjudication in the common law tradition presents a 
complex process irreducible to a single formulaic command. Judging 
 
 
 353. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 64–65; THE 
GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 202. 
 354. See CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 214–18 (discussing how in 
highly contested cases courts cannot escape the obligation and pain of choosing). 
 355. Id. at 219, 220. 
 356. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 66. Accord id. at 137 
(―[W]ithin this narrow range of choice [judges] shall search for social justice.‖). 
 357. Id. at 67. 
 358. See id. at 104. 
 359. Id. at 105. 
 360. Id. at 140. 
 361. See id. at 139–40; CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 192–93. 
 362. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 112–13. 
 363. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 239. 
 364. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 20. 
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requires a discretionary balancing and synthesis of a number of practice-
driven criteria.
365
 Though stare decisis, to be sure, is the first principle in 
that balancing process, it is not an absolute standard overriding all other 
considerations.
366
 Cardozo insisted that to treat it as such would divest 
judges of their discretion, diminish the functional effectiveness of judicial 
practice, and subordinate social justice to the ―demon of formalism.‖367 
From Cardozo‘s pragmatist standpoint, the doctrine of stare decisis 
thus provides the starting-point for judicial decision-making, while the 
well-being of society marks the end-point. Our natural inclination toward 
―consistency between the present idea and . . . our whole stock of 
previously acquired truths,‖368 coupled with the social value and comfort 
we gain from consistency and symmetry in legal doctrine, directs judges to 
begin their deliberations with a presumption favoring the following of 
precedent. Yet the presumption is rebuttable. If following a line of 
precedent cases or extending an established legal rule would work against 
social justice, then stare decisis must yield. Pursuing the instrumental 
values of certainty and symmetry becomes a ―sham‖ if used to uphold 
cases that blemish the law as ―deformities‖ or work against the social 
welfare.
369
 Stare decisis accordingly cannot justify perpetuating legal rules 
that have been rendered archaic and unworkable by changed social or 
technological conditions.
370
 It does not warrant reinforcing ―the walls of 
ancient [legal] categories‖ that time has atrophied and now threaten to 
―become centers of infection if left within the social body.‖371 In sum, 
Cardozo was adamant: if a legal rule has become inconsistent with social 
justice, it should be abandoned.
372
 
The vexing problem of whether to follow precedent thus cannot, from 
the standpoint of legal pragmatism, be resolved simplistically as if the 
 
 
 365. See id. at 112–15, 162–63. 
 366. See id. at 112–13, 150–52; CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 192–93, 
214–16, 239–41. 
 367. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 66. 
 368. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 105. 
 369. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 192–93. 
 370. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 137, 151. 
Cardozo‘s claim mirrors William James‘s more general point that even the most widely held scientific 
and philosophical truths must succumb if experience proves them no longer workable. See also JAMES, 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 107 (―Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, 
scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those 
limits, and we now call these things only relatively true, or true within those borders of experience. 
‗Absolutely‘ they are false.‖). 
 371. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 193. 
 372. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 66, 150; CARDOZO, 
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 239–41. 
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outcome in complex, contested cases is preordained under unwavering 
devotion to precedent. For as Cardozo contended, the obligation to follow 
precedent is itself a principle of social justice. Certainty and uniformity 
command loyalty in judicial decision-making not a priori through natural 
reason, but because of the social interest they serve in helping make the 
common law ―as deep and fundamental as the postulates of justice.‖373 The 
high ideal of evenhandedness—of treating like cases alike—that the 
doctrine of stare decisis represents likewise is best understood as an 
imperative of practice, a necessary incident of an adjudicative enterprise 
where judges hold a degree of lawmaking power.
374
 In addition, the 
instrumental restraints that enterprise imposes on its practitioners not only 
confine them to working within ―the walls of the interstices,‖375 but deny 
them the power to elevate their personal preferences, including a judge‘s 
principled choice to place abiding faith in certainty and precedent, above 
the social good.
376
 Since stare decisis receives its justificatory value from 
the social benefits it confers, to follow precedent that appears, on balance, 
to conflict with social justice amounts to a formalistic extirpation of the 
judicial function.
377
 
This picture of common law adjudication, as a complex practice that at 
once treats following precedent as its ―everyday working rule‖378 while 
demanding that judges exercise their power ―with insight into social 
values, and with suppleness of adaptation to changing social needs,‖379 
fully bears the imprint of pragmatist thought. Philosophical pragmatism 
posits consistency across the range of our beliefs as the first criterion of 
truth.
380
 Yet it further locates the creative genius of human cognition in our 
ability to craft concepts and theories that structure phenomena coherently 
as ―mental modes of adaptation to reality‖381 that prove ―instrumental to a 
control of the environment.‖382 Legal pragmatism likewise finds creative 
genius in judicial practice at the delicate balance-point between certainty 
and stability in predictable outcomes and conscious, purposive growth of 
legal doctrine. For as Justice Cardozo concluded: ―Between these two 
 
 
 373. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 192. 
 374. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 112–15. 
 375. Id. at 129. 
 376. Id. 
 377. See CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 192–93. 
 378. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 20. 
 379. Id. at 94. 
 380. See JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 105. 
 381. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 94. 
 382. DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, supra note 22, at 30. See also DEWEY, 
EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 212, at 10–11. 
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extremes we have the conception of law as a body of rules and principles 
and standards which in their extension to new combinations of events are 
to be sorted, selected, moulded, and adapted in subordination to an end.‖383 
That end, again, answers not to grand theory or the achievement of 
specific results, but to the functional purpose of law and judicial practice, 
―the attainment of a just result.‖384 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Just as the philosophy of pragmatism offers accounts of knowledge, 
truth, and reality that are distinctly modest in speculative pretensions, so 
legal pragmatism comprises a theoretically unadorned picture of 
adjudication. Applied to law, pragmatism spurns juristic abstractions. It 
rejects faith in absolute, full-blossomed legal truths. It assumes an agnostic 
attitude toward thick jurisprudential theory.
385
 Grand, formal explanations 
of the growth of legal concepts smack to pragmatism of nothing more than 
―tender-minded‖ intellectual longing.386 Legal pragmatism instead 
advances quite humble accounts of law and legal doctrine. It presumes that 
legal rules and principles can only be understood when examined 
contextually in the ordinary settings of their social birth. And it posits that 
legal doctrine can only be justified (or justifiably criticized) through 
investigating the internal processes and methods of law, especially the 
practice of judicial decision-making.
387
 
Some critics of legal pragmatism accordingly disparage it as banal,
388
 
as offering nothing more than a mundane account of ordinary judicial 
decision-making.
389
 Compared to the splendor of many grand theories of 
law, pragmatist jurisprudence does seem insipid. Economic theories of law 
 
 
 383. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 294, at 208–09. 
 384. Jacobs & Young, Inc., 230 N.Y. at 242, quoted in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS, supra note 293, at 44. 
 385. See DEWEY, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 224, at 119–22; Dewey, Logical Method and 
Law, supra note 76, at 21–23, 26. 
 386. See James, The Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 66, at 64, ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 4. 
 387. See, e.g., DEWEY, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 224, at 117 (arguing that law must be 
understood in its cultural context as an ―intervening in the complex of other activities, and as itself a 
social process . . . . [that] can be discussed only in terms of the social conditions in which it arises and 
of what it concretely does there.‖); John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 660–62 (1926) (maintaining that legal matters must be analyzed in 
terms of their specific social consequences). 
 388. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN 
LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 89. 
 389. E.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 444; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its 
Application to Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. 
JURIS. 315, 328 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 290. 
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encase legal doctrines in a foresighted rationalism that legal pragmatism 
cannot touch. Originalism in constitutional interpretation simplifies the 
search for constitutional meaning so deftly as to generate absolute 
constitutional truths that legal pragmatists, restrained by method and 
practice, cannot even fancy. Utilitarian jurisprudence, with its singular 
teleological end of achieving the best outcome overall, boasts a formulaic 
neatness that would leave the legal pragmatist sullen in envy were it not 
mere whimsy. Pragmatist jurisprudence quite simply cannot match the 
formulaic certainty and ornamental grandeur of such thick jurisprudential 
theories. 
Yet the flatness of legal pragmatism provides the keystone for its 
descriptive and justificatory virtue. Pragmatism portrays law as a complex 
and variegated social phenomenon whose doctrines are best understood by 
staying close to the empirical conditions and practice-bound context of 
their growth.
390
 Perhaps more than anything, legal pragmatism admonishes 
judges, as well as legal theorists, to practice restraint in jurisprudential 
ambition. It cautions against hasty generalization from attractive working 
hypothesis to ultimate final truth. It counsels the adoption of workable 
rules and principles that serve the end of social well-being, the final cause 
of law‘s very being. While it conceives of law as a wholly human-made 
affair, it urges restraint by judges and disallows roaming at will beyond the 
interstitial walls that precedent and practice erect. And while its 
instrumental orientation calls upon judges to adapt the law as necessary to 
control trouble in the social environment, legal pragmatism treats 
following precedent as the first rule of adjudication for judges working in 
the common law tradition. For in law, as in life, maintaining a coherent set 
of beliefs is the first requisite for achieving intellectual satisfaction. If a 
challenge arises in some corner of a legal system‘s set of doctrinal beliefs, 
the legal pragmatist‘s first inclination is to hold fast to precedent. If 
maintaining the settled law is not possible, then pragmatism counsels 
judges to overrule guardedly, so as to achieve ―a minimum of jolt, a 
maximum of continuity.‖391 
Given its commonplace approach to jurisprudence and the marked 
conservatism of its method, it is remarkable that legal pragmatism churns 
so much anxiety among so many legal scholars. Perhaps the disquiet, 
particularly the worry about result-orientation, comes from those who only 
know of pragmatism through the works of Richard Rorty or Richard 
 
 
 390. See DEWEY, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 224, at 117–20. 
 391. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 35. 
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Posner. Rorty‘s postmodern pragmatism does assume a utilitarian and 
result-oriented cast.
392
 It does encourage epistemological flexibility and 
interpretive flamboyance.
393
 Yet the philosophy of pragmatism did not 
begin or end with Richard Rorty. While his strand of postmodern 
pragmatism enjoys a loyal following in certain circles, it represents only a 
small slice of pragmatist thought. In many respects it is an outlier. For 
despite Rorty‘s frequent honorifics to John Dewey,394 the form of 
pragmatism he advances stands in pointed contrast to pragmatism‘s 
classical and analytic tradition.
395
 
Likewise, Judge Posner‘s theory of pragmatic adjudication advocates a 
number of positions at odds with the analytical legal pragmatism discussed 
herein. He embraces a non-objective view of truth,
396
 considerable 
flexibility toward whether to follow precedent,
397
 a robust 
consequentialism,
398
 and, of course, his signature call for free market 
determinism.
399
 None of these positions reflect the philosophy of 
 
 
 392. See, e.g., RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE, supra note 20, at 84–86, 186, 268, 273, 
276 (identifying pragmatism with utilitarianism); Richard Rorty, Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism, 
in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 84, at 21–25, 29 (characterizing his philosophy as one of 
―romantic utilitarianism‖). 
 393. See, e.g., RORTY, Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 20, at 160, 163–65 (characterizing pragmatism as blurring the 
epistemological difference between what is and what ought to be); Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois 
Liberalism, supra note 20, at 333 (arguing that nothing has any genuine moral force). 
 394. E.g., RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE, supra note 20, at 5, 12, 14–20, 35–39, 66, 73–
77, 88, 272–73; RORTY, Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey, in CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 20, at 37, 40–54; RORTY, Dewey‟s Metaphysics, in CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 20, at 72, 72–88; Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of 
Justice, supra note 388, at 91–94; Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, supra note 20, at 335. 
 395. See PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION, supra note 123, at 64 (1995) (describing 
certain aspects of Rorty‘s philosophy as ―unpragmatist‖); NICHOLAS RESCHER, REALISTIC 
PRAGMATISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY xi–xii (2000) (―[Defending] the 
pragmatic tradition against [Rorty‘s] sort of deconstruction into philosophical vacuity.‖); David 
Bakhurst, Pragmatism and Ethical Particularism, in NEW PRAGMATISTS 122, 128–40 (Cheryl Misak 
ed., 2007) (distinguishing Rorty‘s sense of pragmatism from Dewey and others in the analytic 
pragmatist tradition); Catherine Z. Elgin, Review of Richard Rorty‟s Consequences of Pragmatism, 21 
ERKENNTNIS 423, 427 (1984) (criticizing Rorty as offering positions ―alien to the pragmatist spirit‖); 
Ian Hacking, On Not Being a Pragmatist: Eight Reasons and a Cause, in NEW PRAGMATISTS, supra at 
32, 33 (calling Rorty a ―neo-pragmatist‖ to distinguish him from the classical pragmatists); Hilary 
Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, supra note 84, at 37–51 (contrasting William James‘s ―natural 
realism‖ and his own ―internal realism‖ with Rorty‘s metaphysical antirealism). 
 396. E.g., POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 20, at 114–29, 197–219, 466. 
 397. See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 42–46, 54, 275–77; POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 252–53, 261; POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 20, at 125–26; POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra 
note 20, at 92–98, 374–75, 455–56. 
 398. See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text. 
 399. See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 35–40, 77; POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 2, 24–56, 77–79, 81; RICHARD POSNER, 
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pragmatism. But that should not be surprising, for Judge Posner admits 
that what he means by pragmatism has little in common with philosophical 
pragmatism. He expressly distances himself from the philosophy of 
pragmatism, abjuring it as unhelpful in understanding law or judicial 
practice.
400
 The theory of pragmatic adjudication he advances is one of 
―everyday pragmatism.‖401 It is a mindset reflecting the popular, common 
sense usage of the term ―pragmatism‖—so popular, so everyday, as to be 
described by Posner as ―the untheorized cultural outlook of most 
Americans.‖402 Hence, given his project and express repudiation of 
philosophical pragmatism, nothing Judge Posner says should be taken as 
bearing on legal pragmatism insofar as it is grounded in the tradition of 
pragmatist philosophy. 
Whatever warrant there may or may not be for attributing a result-
oriented standpoint to the postmodern and everyday pragmatisms of Rorty 
and Posner, that charge holds no merit against the classical and analytic 
strand of legal pragmatism chronicled herein. Unfortunately, when legal 
theorists like David Luban, Ronald Dworkin, or others impugn legal 
pragmatism for allegedly advancing an unbridled consequentialism, they 
do so in the most general of terms. They speak of a generic pragmatism. 
Typically, they do not trouble themselves to document specific sources for 
the positions they tag as representative of pragmatist thinking.
403
 To a 
disturbing degree, those positions mischaracterize pragmatism in straw 
man fashion. Specifically as to the charge of result-orientation, the picture 
of legal pragmatism they paint is of a jurisprudence that would reconstruct 
adjudication in the most unbecoming ways. They fashion a capricious 
pragmatism so singularly focused on achieving the best social outcomes as 
 
 
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 6, 95–141 (2001); POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND 
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 239; POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 20, at 15–21, 403–05; 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 20, at 353–92. 
 400. E.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 233–34 (claiming that legal pragmatism 
is not dependent upon nor derived from philosophical pragmatism); POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 10–13, 23, 41–49 (arguing that classical and analytic philosophical 
pragmatism offer little toward understanding legal discourse or practice); POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 227 (asserting that he uses the term 
pragmatism ―in a distinctly low-key sense . . . in particular not the sense in which it is used to name a 
philosophical position‖). 
 401. See POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20 passim. 
 402. Id. at 50. 
 403. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 151–64 (criticizing pragmatist legal 
analysis at length without one reference or citation to support the positions he attributes to 
pragmatism); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 8, at 917–20, 927–28, 934–35 (offering a so-called 
pragmatic justification for originalism in constitutional interpretation, yet providing no account of 
pragmatism other than to treat it as caring about good consequences). 
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to sanction nearly anything in judicial decision-making.
404
 Instead of 
appeal to principle or integrity, this fictional pragmatism is said to 
recommend judging by trickery
405
 and ―crude experimentalism.‖406 It is 
presented as incapable of valuing logical coherence or historical 
consistency in legal decision—deficiencies alleged to blind it to the virtue 
of following precedent, except when convenient to attain desirable 
consequences.
407
 
This picture certainly does portray a lame legal theory. No wonder so 
many legal scholars mimic Tom Stoppard‘s Guildenstern with a rueful, 
―Pragmatism?!—is that all you have to offer?‖408 But the picture is a 
chimera that seriously mismeasures pragmatist jurisprudence. For in its 
classical and analytic tradition, pragmatism is anything but a boorish 
result-oriented philosophy. As William James stated over and over, 
pragmatism offers only a method of deliberative inquiry.
409
 It does not 
champion any special results, commend any doctrines or dogmas, or 
countenance any conclusions or truths a priori. Those truths it does 
sanction come only by way of reflective inquiry, guided by the hindsight 
of experience and directed with foresight toward the resolving of some 
trouble or uncertainty clogging human affairs. In this respect, pragmatism 
does indeed look to the consequences of inquiry. Yet similar to Kant in the 
ethical realm, it does so non-consequentially. For unlike utilitarianism, 
pragmatism does not accept a proposition as true or a course of action as 
right because it leads to better social consequences than its alternatives. 
Rather, pragmatism looks to consequences as indicia in the measurement 
of truth. If a proposition or judgment satisfies intellectually by working to 
resolve some trouble or confusion while fitting logically within a 
comprehensive system of belief, it counts consequentially as ―good in the 
way of belief,‖410 i.e., true. 
As expressed so eloquently by Justice Cardozo, this pragmatist 
conception of deliberation and truth models perspicuously the common 
law method of adjudication. Cardozo embraced legal pragmatism for 
several reasons. He liked how it rejects absolutism, treats legal rules and 
principles as working hypotheses, and dissuades judges from fashioning 
 
 
 404. See supra text accompanying notes 10–18, 161–69. 
 405. See Weinberger, supra note 14, at 415. 
 406. Cook, supra note 5, at 1445. 
 407. See DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 95, 151; Luban, supra note 10, at 43, 45. 
 408. STOPPARD, supra note 1, at 58. 
 409. E.g., JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH, supra note 72, at 37; PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 
29, 31. 
 410. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra note 21, at 42. 
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themselves quixotic adventurers free to pursue their own ideals of justice 
and the common good. From pragmatism‘s concurrent emphases on 
consistency and measured growth in matters of truth and judgment, he 
drew philosophical justification for the common law‘s principled 
commitment to stare decisis as its ―everyday working rule‖411 while still 
allowing conscious, purposive growth in legal doctrine. In no respect did 
Cardozo see in legal pragmatism a result-oriented jurisprudence. Nor 
should we. For when applied to law and jurisprudence, pragmatism in its 
classical and analytic sense commends only one result—justice. 
 
 
 411. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 293, at 20. 
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